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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

MARKET POWER AND COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS OF
CHINA’S SOYBEAN IMPORT MARKET
Globally, China is the number one soybean importer, and the United States, Brazil,
and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters. This research, based on the reverse
residual demand model, developed and estimated a two-country partial equilibrium trade
model to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese soybean import market. This
two-country partial equilibrium trade model incorporates the U.S. residual soybean
supply for China, the Chinese residual demand for U.S. soybeans, and the equilibrium
condition, where the U.S. residual soybean supply equals the Chinese residual soybean
demand. Data used in this research are monthly data from January 1999 to February
2005, 74 observations. Empirical results indicated that Chinese soybean importers have
stronger market power relative to U.S. soybean exporters.
This research also conducted the competitive analysis of the Chinese soybean
import market by examining both annual and monthly data of Chinese soybean imports
from the U.S. and South America (Brazil and Argentina). Results implied that the U.S.
and South America are seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China. Possible
reasons include: 1) seasonal difference--the U.S. and South America have opposing
growing seasons, i.e., different time periods to supply soybeans to markets; and 2)
stronger market power of Chinese soybean importers—China’s strategic choice,
diversifying their soybean suppliers and reducing price increase risk, made the U.S. and
South America complementary soybean suppliers to China.
Additionally, this research compared the soybean export costs to China for the
three countries. Results showed that Brazil has the greatest advantage for production
costs, followed by Argentina and the U.S.; the U.S. has the greatest advantage for internal
and international transportation and marketing costs, followed by Argentina and Brazil.
In aggregate, the total soybean export costs for Brazil were the lowest and the export
costs for Argentina were the highest, with U.S. costs between them.

In terms of policy implications for the U.S. soybean industry facing strong
competition from South America, we cannot expect that U.S. market share in the Chinese
soybean import market can be expanded much. With the development of infrastructure in
Brazil and Argentina, the U.S. advantage will become less and less. Therefore, if the U.S.
soybean industry wants to keep its current position in the Chinese soybean import market,
some governmental policy supports are still necessary.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Background
From a global perspective, soybeans are among the top five agricultural
commodities in harvested area—wheat, rice, corn, soybeans, and barley. As shown in
Figure 1, in 2004 the harvested area for soybeans reached 92 million hectares, ranking
fourth (FAO, 2005). Among these five commodities, the international trade ratio (export
volume divided by production) for soybeans was highest, followed by wheat, barley, corn,
and rice. Figure 2 shows that after 2000, about 30% of soybeans were traded on the
world market (FAO, 2005). This fact implies that international trade for soybeans is
crucial for and of interest to both soybean exporting and importing countries.
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Figure 1. The Top Five Agricultural Commodities in the World (Harvested Area)
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.
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Figure 2. Global International Trade Ratios for the Top Five Agricultural
Commodities
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.
From a production perspective, the U.S., Brazil, Argentina, and China are the top
four soybean producers in the world. The sum of soybean production from these four
countries accounted for 90% of the world total in 2004, with the U.S. at 39%, Brazil at
25%, Argentina at 18%, and China at 8% (USDA-FAS, 2006b). In addition, the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina were also the top three global soybean exporters, and the sum of
soybean exports from these three countries accounted for 92% of the world total in 2004,
with the U.S. at 46%, Brazil at 32%, and Argentina at 15%.
From an import perspective, the top four soybean importing countries are China,
the European Union (EU), Japan, and Mexico. The sum of soybean imports from these
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four countries accounted for 76% of the world total, with China at 40%, the EU at 24%,
Japan at 7%, and Mexico at 6% in 2004.
The U.S. leads the world in soybean production, consumption, and exports.
However, in the last decade, soybean industries in Brazil and Argentina developed very
quickly and became strong competitors for the U.S. in the world soybean market. Excess
supply of soybeans from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina increased quickly in recent years.
To deal with this soybean surplus, Chinese soybean import market became a primary
consideration. Although China is a large soybean producer, China is also the number one
soybean importer in the world. Excess soybean demand by China skyrocketed in the last
decade. With 1.3 billion people, rapid economic growth, and rapid development of the
livestock industry, the Chinese soybean demand is expected to continue to increase, as a
main source of food oil for human consumption and feed for livestock. In contrast,
excess soybean demand by other main soybean importers, including the EU, Japan, and
Mexico, have been quite stable. Therefore, China will continue to play a key role in the
world soybean market.
Objectives of Research
Given the above facts, the Chinese soybean import market can be characterized as
either monopsony, whereby Chinese soybean importers have stronger market power
relative to soybean exporters, including the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, or oligopoly,
whereby these three soybean exporters have stronger market power relative to Chinese
soybean importers. Knowing who has stronger market power is of interest to both
soybean exporting countries and soybean importing countries, especially the United
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States since soybeans are the United States’ number one bulk export commodity.
Although the U.S. is currently the leader of the global soybean industry, the rapid
development of Brazilian and Argentinean soybean industries is threatening this leading
position.
To enhance competitiveness of the U.S. soybean industry and to expand U.S.
market share in the Chinese soybean import market, knowing the market position and
competitive status of these three main soybean suppliers for China is crucial for the U.S.
soybean industry to make production and marketing decisions, and for U.S. policymakers
to formulate soybean policies. As the former secretary of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Ann Veneman (2003), said
"One of the key objectives set forth in the Department’s new
strategic plan is the expansion of international marketing opportunities.
As the strategic plan and our earlier review of the U.S. food and
agricultural system in the 21st century make clear, expanding markets is
critical to the long-term health and prosperity of American agriculture.
With 96 percent of the world’s population living outside the United
States, future growth in demand for food and agricultural products will
occur primarily in overseas markets” (Veneman, 2003).
The objectives of this research include
(1) To provide a global outlook of the soybean industry;
(2) To review soybean policies and their impacts on soybean production,
exportation, and importation for soybean exporting and importing countries;
(3) To develop a two-country partial equilibrium trade model and apply this
model to test market power for the Chinese soybean import market;
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(4) To analyze the competitive structure of these top three soybean suppliers—the
United States, Brazil, and Argentina—in the Chinese soybean import market.
Organization of the Dissertation
This dissertation is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one introduces the
background, objectives, and organization of this dissertation. Chapter two provides an
outlook of the global soybean industry. In this chapter, abundant data and figures draw a
clear picture of the world soybean industry, including the leading soybean producing and
consuming countries along with exporting and importing countries. Chapter three
reviews soybean policies and their impacts on soybean production and exports from the
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, as well as their biotech policies and impacts on soybean
exports into China.
Chapter four reviews the literature, including the Lerner Index, which is a primary
concept to measure market power, the price to market model (PTM), which focuses on
the impacts of the exchange rates on import prices, and the residual demand elasticity
model, which was commonly used in the literature to empirically test market power.
Finally, a review of research on the soybean industry includes the International Oilseed
Model developed by the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in the
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD), and the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, Economic Research Service (USDA-ERS)/Penn State Trade Model.
Chapters five, six, and seven develop and estimate the model, including derivation
of the theoretical model (Chapter five), variable identification (Chapter six), and
empirical estimation and interpretation (Chapter seven). Based on the results from
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Chapter seven, Chapter eight conducts additional competitive analysis of the Chinese
soybean import market. The last chapter, Chapter nine, is discussion and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
OUTLOOK OF THE WORLD SOYBEAN INDUSTRY
Leading Global Soybean Producers
Global harvested area for soybeans increased steadily from 26 million hectares
(63 million acres) in 1964 to 92 million hectares (226 million acres) in 2004 (Figure 3;
FAO, 2005). During this period (1964-2004), the average annual growth rate of the
global harvested area for soybeans was 3%.
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Figure 3. Global Harvested Area for Soybeans
Source: FAOSTAT-Agriculture, 2005.
Among global soybean producers, the top four countries are the U.S., Brazil,
Argentina, and China, as shown in Figure 4. In 2005, soybean output from these four
countries reached 200 million metric tons, accounting for 90% of the global total (USDAFAS, 2006b). Among them, the U.S. led the world in soybean production with an output
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of 84 million metric tons in 2005. Brazilian soybean output reached 57 million metric
tons, about 76% of U.S. production, and ranked second in the world. Argentina produced
41 million metric tons of soybeans and China only produced 18 million metric tons.
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Figure 4. Leading Global Soybean Producing Countries
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
Figure 4 also indicates that the growth of soybean production was quite stable for
the U.S., China, and other countries. In the last four decades, the average annual growth
rates of soybean production in the U.S. and China were 5% and 3%, respectively. In
contrast, soybean production in Brazil and Argentina increased dramatically in recent
years. From 1964 to 2005, the average annual growth rates of soybean production in
Brazil and Argentina were 14% and 27%, respectively (USDA-FAS, 2006b). From these
trends shown in figure 4, it is reasonable to expect that within a few years Brazil may
surpass the U.S. and become the largest soybean producer in the world, if Brazil
continues its current growth rate. In contrast, the growth rate of Argentinean soybean
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production is even higher than that of Brazil, and Argentina has also become a strong
competitor for the U.S. in the world soybean market.
Leading Global Soybean Consumers
Leading global soybean consuming countries (or economic groups) include the
U.S., China, Brazil, Argentina, and the EU-25. Figure 5 compares soybean consumption
among these leading soybean consuming countries (USDA-FAS, 2006b). The U.S. is the
number one soybean consumer in the world. In 2005, U.S. soybean consumption reached
51 million metric tons, accounting for 61% of U.S. soybean output. Brazil, ranking
second in soybean consumption, consumed 31 million metric tons in 2005, accounting for
57% of its production. Argentina’s soybean consumption reached 31 million metric tons
in 2005, accounting for 76% of its production. In contrast, China’s soybean consumption
was 45 million metric tons in 2005, while China’s soybean production was only 18
million metric tons, resulting in a 27 million metric tons shortage.
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Figure 5. Leading Global Soybean Consumers
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
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Soybeans compose a significant part of the human diet, especially for Asian
countries. Soybeans were originally cultivated in China and later spread across Asia.
Traditional soybean products include fermented products such as Indonesian tempeh and
Japanese miso, and nonfermented products such as tofu, sauce, curd, beverage, and
powder. Soybeans can be processed into soyoil and soymeal. Soyoil is widely consumed
around the world as food oil, especially in China, while soymeal is used for animal feed.
Figure 6 illustrates the soybean usage distribution of the world and the leading soybean
consuming countries in 2004. Globally, only 6% of soybeans were used directly for food,
and 86% of soybeans were crushed into meal for feed and oil for food or industrial usage
in 2004 (USDA-FAS, 2006b). Thus, China’s domestic consumption has a greater
proportion of soybeans used as food, e.g., tofu, sauce, curd, beverage, and powder.
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Figure 6. Comparison of Soybean Usage Distribution
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
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In the U.S., over 60% of soybeans were consumed domestically. Of this, 8%
were waste or used as seed, and 92% were crushed into soyoil and soymeal in 2005,
whereas 83% of soymeal was manufactured into feed and 17% of soymeal was exported.
For soyoil, 92% of it was used for food and only 8% exported (USDA-FAS, 2006b).
Brazil, Argentina, and the EU followed a similar pattern to the United States. In contrast,
China followed a different pattern for soybean consumption. In 2005, Chinese soybean
consumption totaled 38 million metric tons, of which 21%, or 8 million metric tons, was
used directly for food, and 74%, or 28 million metric tons, were crushed into soyoil for
food and soymeal for feed (USDA-FAS, 2006b).
Leading Global Soybean Exporters
The top three soybean exporters in the world include the U.S., Brazil, and
Argentina. Figure 7 shows that Brazil’s soybean exports reached 25 million metric tons
in 2005, surpassing the U.S., and Brazil became the number one soybean exporter in the
world. The U.S. exported 24 million metric tons of soybeans, a 3 million metric tons fall
compared to 2004. Brazil’s soybean exports increased dramatically in the last decade
from 4 million metric tons in 1995 to 25 million metric tons in 2005, an over 500%
increase. Soybean exports from Argentina also increased in recent years, and reached 10
million metric tons in 2005. Brazil and Argentina became strong competitors for the U.S.
in the world soybean market.
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Figure 7. Leading Global Soybean Exporters
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
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Figure 8. Export Shares of Top Soybean Exporters in the World Soybean Market
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
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The export shares in the world soybean market for Brazil, the U.S., and Argentina
were 39%, 37%, and 16%, respectively (USDA-FAS, 2006b) in 2005. The sum of
soybean exports from these three countries accounted for 92% of the global total. The
trends for market shares and the structural changes in the world soybean market are
shown in figure 8. The U.S. soybean export share in the world market has been
decreasing, especially in the last decade. In 1995, the U.S. soybean export share was
73%, but fell to 37% in 2005, a 36% market share loss in the world soybean market. In
contrast, Brazilian market share in the world soybean market increased from 11% in 1995
to 39% in 2005, gaining 28% more within 10 years. Argentina also competes with the
U.S. in the world soybean market, and Argentinean market share increased from 6% in
1995 to 16% in 2005.
Leading Global Soybean Importers
The leading global soybean importers include China, the EU-25, Japan, and
Mexico as shown in figure 4. China’s soybean imports skyrocketed in the last decade
from 0.8 million metric tons in 1994 to 27 million metric tons in 2005, an almost 27-fold
increase, while soybean imports into the EU, Japan, and Mexico remained quite stable.
In 2005, China’s soybean imports accounted for 41% of the world total (USDA-FAS,
2006b). Recall that China produced 18 million metric tons and its acreage annual growth
rate was 3%. Thus soybean imports play an important role for Chinese consumers. The
EU-25 imported 14 million metric tons of soybeans in 2005, which was 22% of global
soybean imports. Soybean imports for Japan and Mexico were 4 million metric tons each.
Japanese and Mexican soybean import shares were each only about 6% of the world total.
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Figure 9. Leading Global Soybean Importers
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
Summary
In summary, the leading global soybean producers are the U.S., Brazil, Argentina,
and China. The leading global soybean consumers are the U.S., Brazil, China, Argentina,
and the EU-25. The leading global soybean exporters include the U.S., Brazil, and
Argentina, and the leading global soybean importers are China, the EU-25, Japan, and
Mexico, as shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10. The Global Soybean Market
The growth of soybean production in the U.S. and China was quite steady, with an
annual growth rate of 5% and 3%, respectively, in the last four decades. In contrast, the
annual growth rate of the soybean industries in Brazil and Argentina were 15% and 28%,
respectively, during the same period. However, soybean consumption in the U.S., Brazil,
and Argentina did not increase as much as their production. Therefore, soybean exports
became an important channel for the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina to deal with their
soybean surplus. Soybean exports from Brazil and Argentina increased rapidly in recent
years and became main competitors in the world soybean market.
On the other hand, the main global soybean importers, including the EU, Japan,
and Mexico did not increase their soybean imports much in the past. In contrast, for
China, as the number soybean importer, Chinese soybean imports skyrocketed in the last
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decade and became the primary soybean import market in the world, attracting more
attention from top soybean exporters, including the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
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CHAPTER THREE
SOYBEAN POLICY REVIEW
Soybean Policies in the United States
U.S. Soybean Policies
Globally, the U.S. is the number one soybean producer, consumer, and exporter.
Nationally, U.S. soybean production value reached $24 billion in 2004, ranking second
among all agricultural bulk commodities behind corn (USDA-NASS, 2005). Compared
with two other main commodities, corn and wheat, the planted area for soybeans has
continuously increased in the United States, whereas the planted areas for corn and wheat
have been either relatively stable or declined (Figure 11). From these trends shown in
Figure 11, it is reasonable to expect that soybeans will surpass corn and become the
number one (from a planted area perspective) agricultural bulk commodity in the United
States, assuming that the U.S. does not make significant changes in current agricultural
policies.
Behind the leading position for the U.S. soybean industry both nationally and
internationally, the support policies for soybeans from the U.S. government played a very
important role. The U.S. soybean subsidy program, instituted in 1941, was a commodity
loan program, which supported soybean market prices. Under this program, producers
used their soybeans as collateral for government loans. Depending on the market price
level, farmers chose to either default on these non-recourse loans, keeping their loan and
forfeiting soybean ownership to the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), or farmers
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could sell their soybeans and repay their loans plus interest (Westcott and Price, 1999,
2001).
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Figure 11. Comparison of Planted Acres for U.S. Soybeans, Corn, and Wheat
Source: USDA-NASS, 2005.
The marketing loan program began in the mid-1980s and supported farmers’
incomes. Under this program, farmers could operate as described above. Alternatively,
marketing loan provisions also allowed repayment of soybean loans at less than the
original loan rate when soybean market prices fell (USDA-FSA, 2005a). Instead,
government incentives encouraged farmers to retain ownership and sell their soybeans on
the market at a price lower than the loan rate, rather than default on their loans and forfeit
ownership to the USDA (Westcott and Price, 1999, 2001).
Under these government programs, U.S. government payments to soybean
farmers increased rapidly, especially in the past decade. For example, net government
expenditures totaled only $5 million in 1990 and increased to over $3 billion in 2001 as
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shown in Figure 12 (USDA-FSA, 2005b). Because both domestic and international
soybean prices recovered from very low to a higher level, the net government
expenditures for soybeans dropped significantly in 2003 and 2004.
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Figure 12. U.S. Net Expenditures on the Soybean Industry
Source: USDA-FSA, 2005b.
Recent U.S. soybean policies include both direct government and counter-cyclical
payments (CCP), both of which began with the 2002 Farm Bill and extend through 2007.

A description of the calculation of each follows. The formula for direct government
payments for soybeans is
(1)

Direct payments = Base acreage x Program yield x 85% x Direct payment rate

In regards to variable definitions, the USDA, Farm Service Agency (USDA-FSA) defines
base acreage from farmers’ one time choice of the following options. This choice

extends through 2007:
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• “to use 2002 Production Flexibility Contract (PFC) acreage to establish CCP
base acres;
• to use 2002 PFC acreage and add oilseed base history for the 1998-2001 crop
years (three options were available under this scenario that allowed flexibility
between oilseed base acres and other crop base acres); and
• to calculate all base acres using the farm’s planted and approved prevented
planted history from 1998-2001” (USDA-FSA, 2003).

The program yield for the above direct government payments is obtained by multiplying
the 1998 through 2001 average yield for soybeans times the historic yield ratio, which is
the ratio that results from dividing the national average yield for soybeans, 1981-1985; by
the national average yield, 1998-2001. The direct payment rate (DPR), set by the USDA,
equals $0.44/bushel of soybeans in the 2002 Farm Bill. Direct payments relate only to
planted acreage, regardless of the crop planted.
In contrast, the formula for counter-cyclical payments is more complicated than
that for direct government payments. Counter-cyclical payments are influenced not only
by base acreage and program yield, but also by soybean market prices (also referred to as
marketing year average (MYA) price in the following formula). The formula for
counter-cyclical payments (CCP) can be expressed as follows:

(2)

Counter-cyclical payment = Base acreage × 85% × Program yield × CCP rate

(3)

CCP rate = Max {0, (Target price – Effective price)}

(4)

Effective price = Max {MYA price, Loan rate} + Direct payment rate (DPR)

The base acreage in equation (2) is defined above. For program yield in equation (2),
farmers can use one of the following two methods:
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•

“93.5 percent of the 1998-2001 average yield; or

•

the direct payment yield (PFC yield) plus 70 percent of the difference between
the 1998-2001 average and the direct payment yield” (USDA-FSA, 2003).

The counter-cyclical payment rate (CCP rate) in equation (2) is related to both the target
price and the effective price, determined in equation (3). The target price is set by the

USDA. The effective price is affected by the market year average (MYA) price, the loan
rate (see Figure 13), and the direct payment rate in equation (4).
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Figure 13. U.S. Loan Rate for Soybeans
Source: USDA-FSA, 2005a.
Counter-cyclical payments are closely related to soybean market prices (MYA
prices) through these three equations (2, 3, and 4). If soybean market prices (MYA prices)

are higher than the national loan rate, then the effective price in equation (4) is the MYA
price plus the direct payment rate ($0.44/bushel). If not, the effective price equals the
loan rate plus the direct payment rate (DPR) in equation (4). For the target price in

equation (3), the 2002 Farm Bill sets it at $5.80/bushel through 2007. When the target
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price is higher than the effective price, the difference between the target price

($5.80/bushel) and the effective price is the CCP rate in equations (2) and (3). Otherwise
the CCP rate is zero, i.e., if the target price is less than the effective price. Final countercyclical payments equal 85% of the base acreage multiplied by the program yield and the
CCP rate, determined in equation (3). If the market price (MYA price) exceeds the loan

rate in equation (4), so that the sum of the MYA price and the DPR, i.e., the effective price,
is greater than the target price in equation (3), the CCP rate equals zero and countercyclical payments will not occur.

With these supportive policies, the U.S. soybean industry has developed steadily.
Figure 14 shows U.S. soybean production, consumption, exports, and stocks. U.S.
soybeans stocks have been quite stable in the past, and U.S. soybean production,
consumption, and exports have been increased steadily.
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Figure 14. U.S. Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D, 2006b.
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U.S. Biotech Policies

The U.S. leads the world in agricultural biotechnology research, adoption,
commercialization, and exports of biotech products. The main U.S. biotech varieties
include soybeans, cotton, and corn. With the expectation of lower production costs,
higher yields, and reduced herbicide use, U.S. farmers adopted biotech commodities
immediately after they were available in 1996 (USDA-ERS, 2004). From 1996 to 2004,
U.S. biotech commodities expanded dramatically. For example, in 2005, 87% of
soybeans, 79% of cotton, and 52% of corn planted in the United States were biotech
varieties as shown in Table 1 (USDA-ERS, 2005a).
Table 1. Main U.S. Biotech Varieties (Percent of Planted Acreage)
Commodity
Soybeans
Cotton
Corn

2000
54%
61
25

2001
68%
69
26

2002
75%
71
34

2003

2004

81%
73
40

85%
76
45

2005
87%
79%
52%

Source: USDA-ERS, 2005a.
In the U.S., the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) are jointly responsible for
the regulation of biotech food commodities. Each of these three agencies has a different
focus regarding the regulation of biotech food commodities: the USDA is primarily
responsible for determining whether a new product is safe to grow or not; the EPA is in
charge of the reviews of the potential impact on the environment imposed by any biotech
commodities; and the FDA is focused on protecting consumers and has final authority to
declare whether a product is safe to eat or not (UF-FEI, 2005).
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Before the commercialization of any biotech commodities, field testing is
required as a mandated part of the approval process. In 2001, there were about 13,000
multiple site field tests in the United States. In 1993, the FDA announced that biotech
foods did not require any special regulation, as they were “not inherently dangerous”.
Since the FDA approved the first biotech commodity -- the Flavr savr tomato -- in 1994,
the USDA has approved more than 50 biotech commodities for planting, including corn,
tomatoes, soybeans, cotton, potatoes, rapeseed (canola), squash, beets, papaya, rice, flax,
and chicory (UF-FEI, 2005).
Currently the EU, China and Japan, require that any food products containing
biotech contents should be labeled (Marchant, Fang, and Song, 2002). However, the U.S.
does not require mandatory labeling for all biotech food products. At the 1997 Codex3.1
food labeling meeting, the U.S. delegate expressed U.S. stance on biotech products as
"Because foods derived from plants developed through different
methods of breeding do not differ in any uniform manner, under United
States laws and policies, the failure to identify a plant breeding process
is not itself considered to be an omission of a material fact of the type
that would cause the food to be misbranded. Thus, the United States
believes that, as a class, foods obtained through biotechnology do not
warrant any mandatory labeling with regard to the method by which
they were obtained."
"The United States believes that, if consumers wish to have
access to information on foods obtained through biotechnology,
manufacturers ought to provide such information on a voluntary basis"
(OCA, 2005).

3.1

The Codex Alimentarius Commission is a United Nations body responsible for implementation of the
Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization Joint food Standards Program. This
program was established to develop international food standards in the interests of enhancing consumer
protection and ensuring fair international trade in food products. Codex Alimentarius is a Latin term
meaning a code of law governing foods.
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Brazilian Soybean Policies
Brazilian Agricultural Policies

Brazil has the largest economy in South America and the eighth-largest economy
in the world, with a GDP of $635 billion in real terms (2000=100) in 2004 (USDA-ERS,
2006). Brazil is endowed with vast agricultural resources. Brazil’s agricultural area
mainly includes two regions—the temperate south and tropical center-west. In the south,
with temperate climate, higher rainfall, better soils, greater technology and input use,
adequate infrastructure, and more experienced farmers, make Brazilian south its main
grain, oilseed, and export commodities production area (Flaskerud, 2003).
Brazilian agriculture is well diversified, and the country is largely self-sufficient
in food. Agriculture accounts for 8% of the country's GDP, and employs about onequarter of the labor force in more than 6 million agricultural businesses. Brazil is the
world's largest producer of sugarcane and coffee, and a net exporter of cocoa, soybeans,
orange juice, tobacco, forest products, and other tropical fruits and nuts. Besides crop
production, Brazilian livestock production is also very important in many sections of the
country. On a value basis, production is 60% field crops and 40% livestock (Wikimedia
Foundation, 2005).
Rapid urbanization and income growth caused great demand for both cooking oil
and meat products. To meet domestic demand for meat products, the poultry, pork, and
dairy industries developed quickly (Williams and Thompson, 1984). As a result, feed
demand increased dramatically as well. Along with the increased demand for cooking oil,
the demand for soybeans skyrocketed. This increased domestic demand along with
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higher world soybean prices in the late 1990s, as well as government support policies,
encouraged rapid expansion of soybean production in Brazil.
Prior to the 1990s, Brazil experienced an unstable macroeconomic environment,
including hyperinflation, a heavy external debt burden, high interest rates, and periods of
severe currency overvaluation. Brazil also imposed an import tax on agricultural inputs
and export tax on agricultural products. These policies distorted domestic agricultural
production (Peng, 2002; Schnepf, et al., 2001; Victor, Marchant, and Isinika, 1995).
In general, Brazil’s agriculture suffered much due to its unstable macroeconomic
environment and unfavorable agricultural policies. However, Brazil’s soybean industry
was a special case, which has been expanding. The reasons can be summarized as
follows:
1. The Brazilian government considered soybeans as a strategic product for the
government from both the standpoint of technological advancement and the volume of
financial resources perspective. From the 1960s to the 1980s, the soybean industry
contributed greatly to Brazil’s economy, at least from the following perspectives: “(1)
saving foreign exchange, (2) increasing foreign exchange earnings, (3) improving the
national diet, (4) stimulating industrial development, (5) holding down food price
increases, and (6) territorial occupation.” (Warnken, 1999).
2. The Brazilian soybean industry benefited from its import-substitution strategy.
After World War II, the Brazilian Government implemented an import-substitution
strategy to stimulate the domestic economy and to reduce external debts. Under the
import-substitution strategy, the agricultural sector lost their incentive to export and put
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more pressure on Brazil’s limited foreign exchange reserves. To compensate for the
shortage of foreign exchange, Brazil’s government gave the soybean industry special
treatment to expand exports and increase foreign exchange (Schnepf, et al., 2001).
3. The government support policy played a key role in the Brazilian soybean
boom. The Brazilian government’s supportive programs included the government
acquisition program and the National Rural Credit System (Warnken, 1999). Under the
government acquisition program, the Brazilian government set a minimum price level for
soybeans and, if the market price was below the minimum price, the government would
purchase soybeans from farmers at the minimum price. This program first began in 1975,
and did not play an important role in the 1970s and early 1980s. In the late 1980s this
program did protect Brazilian soybean farmers from low domestic soybean prices.
Brazil’s National Rural Credit System (NRCS) included three components:
production credit, investment credit, and marketing loan credit (Warnken, 1999). Among
these three components, production credit was the largest one. The government provided
soybean farmers credit for their production of soybeans with “negative interest rates” (the
inflation rate was higher than the loan interest rate) for most of the years from 1970 to
1990. In the late 1970s and the early 1980s, about 50% of Brazilian soybean production
used government loans and production credits averaged about one-third of the total value
of soybean output.
In contrast, investment credit provided farmers and cooperatives funds for their
investments on infrastructure improvements, such as correction of soil acidity, soil
conservation, rural electrification, and purchase of agricultural machinery, irrigation
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equipment, and transportation vehicles (Warnken, 1999). Investment credit was also
subsidized by a “negative interest rate” similar to production credit. The marketing loan
program primarily helped soybean cooperatives and processors for soybean storage and
transportation, as well as processing. The government provided loans to cooperatives or
processors for up to six months with a “negative interest rate”.
Since the mid-1990s, the Brazilian government changed its agricultural policies
and tried to eliminate its minimum price intervention and government buffer stock
gradually (USDA-ERS, 2002). At the same time, the Brazilian government used Federal
taxes in addition to an array of state taxes on agricultural exports. Currently, although
Brazilian subsidy programs still exist, they do not play as important a role as they did
before.
With all of these support programs, Brazil has been a net exporter of soybeans
(see Figure 15), and a strong competitor for the U.S. in the international soybean market.
In 2005, soybean production in Brazil totaled 57 million metric tons, accounting for 25%
of the world total (USDA-FAS, 2006b). However, Brazilian domestic demand for
soybeans did not increase as fast as production. Therefore, the Brazilian government
used soybean exports to reduce its domestic soybean surplus. In 2005, Brazilian soybean
exports reached 22 million metric tons, an increase of 18 million metric tons, compared
with 4 million metric tons of soybean exports in 1994, and became the second largest
soybean exporter in the world soybean market, competing with the U.S. and Argentina.
One interesting observation is that Brazilian soybean stock changes. Prior to 1999,
Brazilian soybeans stocks were very low. However, after 1999, Brazilian soybean stocks
increased dramatically from less than1 million metric tons in 1999 to 17 million metric
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tons in 2005. This huge soybean stock increase implies that Brazilian soybean storage
capacity has been improved greatly. In addition, this improved infrastructure may
increase Brazil’s competitiveness in the international market. From another perspective,
Brazil also needs to boost their soybean exports to avoid continuous increase of their
soybean stockpile.
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Figure 15. Brazilian Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D, 2006b.
Brazilian Biotech Policies

For biotech policies in Brazil, the Brazilian Government invested heavily in
biotech research and development in the early 2000s with estimated $15 million per year
since 2001 (James, 2004). However, adoption and commercialization of biotech
commodities were not allowed before 2003. Although the Government banned biotech
agricultural production in Brazil, illegal growing of biotech commodities, mainly biotech
soybeans, was quite common in Brazil before 2003. Finally, the Brazilian Government
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officially approved planting of biotech soybeans in 2003. The approval was temporary,
pending the passage of a biotech bill that will provide a permanent framework for
evaluating and approving biotech commodities in Brazil (James, 2005). In 2005, Brazil
experienced the largest increase in biotech soybean adoption relative to total production
of soybeans, with 9.4 million hectares of biotech varieties compared with 5 million in
2004.
Argentinean Soybean Policies
Argentinean Agricultural Policies

Argentina is the second largest country in South America and the eighth largest in
the world. Argentina has a wealth of natural resources and a good climate, which gives
Argentina a natural advantage in agricultural production. From the early 1950s,
Argentina was already a major corn and wheat producer but did not produce much
soybeans. Similar to Brazil, Argentinean agriculture suffered due to high inflation, an
often overvalued exchange rate, and a heavy external debt burden.
Although the Argentinean Government undertook a series of programs to stabilize
its macroeconomic conditions during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, their macroeconomic
environment had not improved (Peng, 2002; Schnepf, et al. 2001). In addition, the
Argentinean Government adopted an import substitution strategy, which further
dampened their agricultural industry. Under this import substitution strategy, the
Argentinean Government tried to control and reduce imports by setting high tariffs and
quantitative restrictions (quotas), export taxes, and manipulated exchange rates. Prior to
1977, Argentinean import tariffs on fertilizers and agricultural chemicals were 60 and 65
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percent. Export taxes on grains and oilseeds were initially set at 18 percent in 1982, and
varied each year. As a result, Argentinean farmers had to use their inefficient, overpriced
domestic inputs, and sold their agricultural products domestically at lower prices.
In 1991, Argentina enacted economic reforms moving toward a free market
economy. Schnepf, et al. (2001) summarized the main reform policies related to
agriculture in Argentina as follows:


“The elimination of all export taxes on major grain and processed

oilseed products in 1991, except for the 3.5-percent tax on
unprocessed oilseed exports.


The elimination of all quantitative restrictions on imported
agricultural inputs.



The reduction of tariffs on imported agricultural inputs to a range
not to exceed 15 percent of CIF (cost, insurance, and freight) value,
although an additional 10-percent tax was levied on most imported
agricultural inputs.



The exemption from tariffs and taxes of agricultural inputs classified
as capital goods—i.e., those whose economic life extends beyond one
production cycle—such as embryos, certified seed, and trucks.



The elimination of several government commodity agencies that held
export monopolies for their respective commodities (e.g., the
National Grain Board, the National Meat Board, and similar
agencies for sugar and tobacco).



The initiation of privatization in the marketing and transportation
infrastructure, including state-owned grain elevators, port facilities,
and railroads.”

These favorable policies along with high international prices for soybeans greatly
spurred Argentinean soybean production. In 2005, soybean output in Argentina reached
41 million metric tons, accounting for 18% of world soybean production, ranking third
globally behind the U.S. at 38% and Brazil at 25% (USDA-FAS, 2006b). However,
soybean consumption in Argentina did not grow as quickly as soybean production (Figure
31

16). The Argentinean population is small and stable and the livestock industry is also
relatively small. In addition, the cattle industry in Argentina is predominantly grass-fed;
thus soymeal demand is limited. As a result, the international market was Argentina’s
primary choice to deal with its soybean surplus. Argentinean soybean exports increased
dramatically from 2.6 million metric tons in 1994 to 10 million metric tons in 2005,
which accounted for 16% of world soybean exports (USDA-FAS, 2006b).
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Figure 16. Argentinean Soybean Production, Consumption, Exports, and Stocks
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
Argentinean Biotech Policies

For Argentina’s biotech policies, Argentina conducted field trials for biotech
soybeans as early as 1986, and began to grow biotech soybeans commercially in 1996.
Following its introduction, biotech soybeans expanded dramatically in Argentina. In
2005, almost the entire national planted area for soybeans was biotech varieties, leading
the world in biotech soybean adoption and commercialization (James, 2005).
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With abundant arable land and quick adoption of new technology, Argentina is a
strong competitor in the international soybean market. However, one disadvantage for
the Argentinean soybean industry is that is Argentina’s pervasive policy intervention that
ultimately promoted other sectors of the economy at the expense of agriculture. For
example, although its export tax was eliminated in 1991, in March 2002 a 13.5 percent
export tax was imposed on soybeans and a 10 percent tax on most other primary
agricultural products (Torgerson, 2002). Then in April 2002, export taxes were raised to
20 percent for many agricultural products, including soybeans, wheat, feed grains, and
vegetable oils and soymeal. Soybeans were still assessed a 3.5 percent surcharge, making
the export tax 23.5 percent for soybeans This recently re-imposed export tax dampened
the soybean industry in Argentina and weakened their advantage in the international
soybean market.
Chinese Biotech Policies and Soybean Trade
China’s Situation and Outlook

With a population of 1.3 billion and an annual GDP growth rate of more than 8%
in the past decade, China is not only a large producer of agricultural commodities, but
also a large consumer of agricultural commodities including soybeans. In 2004, China
produced 31% of world rice, 27% of rapeseed, 19% of corn, 27% of cotton, 16% of
wheat, and 9% of soybeans (FAO, 2005). China is also a large player in international
grain and oilseed markets, exporting almost four million metric tons of corn and
importing 27 million metric tons of soybeans in 2005 (USDA-FAS, 2006b).
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In the past, China was also a major soybean exporter in the world market.
However, recently, demand for soybeans in China increased dramatically resulting in
China becoming a net importer in the late 1990s from a net exporter in the 1980s.
Figures 17 and 18 show the change of China’s status in the soybean world market
(USDA-FAS, 2006b). The main soybean suppliers for China include the U.S., Brazil,
and Argentina. Since 85% of U.S. soybeans, 22% of Brazilian soybeans, and 98% of
Argentinean soybeans were biotech varieties in 2004, any changes in China’s biotech
policies may have a significant impact on China’s soybean trade.

50
45
Million Metric Tons

40
30

27

20

17

10
0

0
1965

1970

1975

Production

1980

1985

Consumption

1990

1995
Imports

2000

2005
Exports

Figure 17. Chinese Soybean Production, Consumption, Imports, and Exports
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006b.
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Chinese Biotech Policies and Trade Impacts

Since 1986, China has invested heavily in biotech research, ranking second only
to the United States (Huang and Wang, 2002). By the year 2001, more than 130 species
were obtained, including insect-resistant, bacterial-, fungus- and virus-resistant,
salt-tolerant, drought-resistant, nutrition enrichment, quality improvement, production of
edible oral vaccines and recombinant pharmaceuticals (Marchant and Song, 2005).
However, only Bt cotton, delayed ripening tomatoes, cucumber mosaic virus (CMV)resistant sweet peppers, and color-altered petunias were approved for production within
China. By far, Bt cotton is the dominant biotech commodity in China, and no other food
commodities have been approved for production (Marchant, Fang, and Song, 2002).
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Currently, the Chinese government is struggling with the adoption and
commercialization of biotech rice. China’s agricultural researchers state that
biotechnologies for rice are mature and ready for adoption and commercialization. An
official from the Chinese MOA said that they have already accepted the application for
the safety evaluation (for the safety certificate) of biotech rice varieties (Cheng and Peng,
2002). This official also mentioned that accepting the safety evaluation does not mean
that the government will approve the adoption and commercialization of biotech rice
varieties. Before commercialization of biotech rice, a series of field experiments,
production experiments and other related experiments are required. The Chinese
government will be very cautious in the adoption and commercialization of biotech rice,
since currently no other countries have approved biotech rice for large-scale
commercialization (Song and Marchant, 2005).
Field tests, environmental releases and commercialization of biotech plants are
regulated in China (Figure 19). In November, 1993, the State Science and Technology
Commission of China (SSTC) issued “Biosafety Administration Regulations on Genetic
Engineering”, which was the first law on biosafety in China (Marchant, Fang, and Song,

2002). Three years later, “Biosafety Administration Implementation Regulations on
Agricultural Genetic Engineering” was issued by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture

(MOA), and took effect on the same date, July 10, 1996 (Chinese MOA, 1996).
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December 1993

July 1996

May 2001

July 2001

March 2002

April 2002

“Biosafety Administration Regulations on Genetic Engineering”
was issued by the State Science and Technology Commission and
took effect on the same date, December 24, 1993.
“Biosafety Administration Implementation Regulations on
Agricultural Genetic Engineering” was issued by the Ministry of
Agriculture of China, and took effect on the same date, July 10,
1996.
“Biosafety Administration Regulations on Agricultural
Transgenic Products” were passed by the State Council of China
on May 9, 2001, and issued and took effect on May 23, 2001.
(1)“Biosafety Evaluation and Administration Regulations on
Agricultural Transgenic Products,” (2)“Labeling
Administration Regulations on Agricultural Transgenic
Products,” and (3)“Import Safety Administration Regulations
on Agricultural Transgenic Products” were passed by the
Chinese Ministry of Agriculture on July 11, 2001, with an effective
date for implementation on March 20, 2002.
“Temporary Administration Procedure of Import of
Agricultural biotech Products” was issued on March 10, 2002
before the above effective date March 20, 2002, and was scheduled
to terminate on December 20, 2002.
On April 8, 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Health issued “the
Sanitary Administration Rules for Transgenic Food” which took
effect on July 1, 2002.

October 2002

On October 11, 2002, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture
announced that the above temporary import regulations would be
extended to September 20, 2003.

July 2003

On July 17, 2003, the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture announced
that the above temporary import regulations would be further
extended to April 20, 2004.

April 2004

The temporary import regulations expired and the above three
regulations took effect on April 20, 2004.

May 2004

“The Administrative Measures of Inspection and Quarantine on
Entry-Exit Transgenic Products” was issued on May 24, 2004 by
China's State General Administration for Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ) and took effect on the same
day.

Figure 19. History of China’s Biotech Regulations
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Prior to China’s accession into the World Trade Organization on December 11,
2001, the Chinese government passed its “Biosafety Administration Regulations on
Agricultural Biotech Products,” which were issued and took effect on May 23, 2001

(Chinese MOA, 2001a). These regulations provided general guidelines for the
development, distribution, and use of agricultural biotech products and required a safety
certificate and labeling for any agricultural biotech products from either domestic sources
or imports. The Chinese MOA issued three separate implementing regulations for the
above guidelines on January 5, 2002: (1) “Biosafety Evaluation and Administration
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products,” (2) “Import Safety Administration
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products,” and (3) “Labeling Administration
Regulations on Agricultural Biotech Products” (Chinese MOA, 2001b). These new

regulations placed restrictions on Chinese imports of biotech products, including those
imported from the United States. The effective date for implementation was originally
set for March 20, 2002.
Specific rules on imports of biotech products from the above regulations included
the following:
(1) biotech products imported into China required test results or data obtained
from in-country field experiments within the exporting country (or a third country) to
prove that the products are safe for human consumption and do not impose biosafety risks
to other plants, animals, or the environment,
(2) each shipment of biotech products imported into China needs a single or
separate safety certificate accompanying each shipment,
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(3) the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture’s approval process can take up to 270
days to grant safety certificates required for imported biotech products,
(4) there is a "zero" threshold level (based on qualitative test results) for biotech
content in foods,
(5) decision-making should be based on demonstrated risks (bioharzards) from
scientific data, whereby the expert panel should play an important role in the decisionmaking process.
Rules on labeling biotech products included the following:
(1) all products containing biotech content should be labeled correctly, otherwise,
the products are not allowed to enter unless they are re-labeled,
(2) labeling rules are applied to the following imported biotech products: soybean
seeds, soybeans, soybean flour, soymeal, soyoil, corn seeds, corn, corn oil, corn meal,
rapeseed seeds, rapeseeds, rapeseed oil, rapeseed meal, cotton seeds, tomato seeds, fresh
tomatoes, and tomato ketchup (tomato jam).
Before the effective date to implement these three regulations (March 20, 2002),
the Chinese government delayed their implementation (Chinese MOA, 2003). Instead,
the Chinese MOA issued a temporary measure, “Temporary Administration Procedure of
Import of Agricultural Biotech Products”, which allowed exporters to ship biotech

products, including U.S. biotech soybeans, into China using temporary import certificates
through December 20, 2002. Each temporary import certificate granted by the Chinese
MOA was good for 10 shipments (Chinese MOA, 2002). After three extensions of this
temporary measure, the above three regulations eventually took effect on April 20, 2004
(USDA-FAS, 2004).
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Immediately after the effective date of implementation for these three regulations,
China's State General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine
(AQSIQ) announced a new regulation related to the administration of biotech products,
“Administrative Measures of Inspection and Quarantine on Entry-Exit of Biotech
Products”, on May 24, 2004 (Chinese AQSIQ, 2004; USDA-FAS, 2004). These

measures not only apply to the inspection and quarantine of biotech products via trade,
but also apply to processing, research, and production. By these new measures, Chinese
importers must declare whether the imported products are biotech or not when they apply
for inspection and quarantine. If the products are biotech, the importers shall provide
relevant documents including a safety certificate and review and approval documents
needed for labeling. For biotech products, labeling is mandatory by the above
implementing regulations. In addition, these measures also authorize the AQSIQ to
conduct random biotech tests even if products are declared as non-biotech.
China’s biotech regulations and policies did raise concern by U.S. agricultural
exporters and policymakers as well as Chinese agricultural importers. Requiring safety
certificates incurred additional costs and shipment delays at the initiation of these new
regulations in the late spring and summer of 2001. In addition, these regulations have the
potential to be used by the Chinese government as a non-tariff barrier to control soybean
imports. Upon examining monthly data, Song and Marchant (2005) found that China’s
biotech policy did not impose significant impacts on U.S. soybean exports to China in the
long-run. This conclusion will be empirically tested in this research.
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CHAPTER FOUR
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Lerner Index
Lerner (1934) developed an index (the Lerner Index) to measure market power of
a single firm. The Lerner index is defined as

(5)

LI =

P − MC
P

where the variable P is the market price and MC is the marginal cost. The Lerner Index
is able to measure the degree of market power of a firm in an imperfect market, but it was
difficult to use empirically because marginal cost data are typically unavailable.
However, the Lerner Index does provide a provocative idea to measure market power.
Based on the Lerner Index, subsequent literature found other ways to approximate the
Lerner Index to measure market power in an imperfectly competitive market. These
measures include Pricing to Market Model and Residual Demand Elasticity Model.
Pricing to Market Model
Krugman (1986) first developed the concept of “pricing to market” (PTM). PTM
was used to address the relationship between the changes in exchange rates and import
prices. Krugman defined PTM as “import prices fall ‘too little’ when a currency
appreciates.” Upon examining the trade data of U.S. imported manufactured products
from Germany, Krugman summarized as “pricing to market when the exchange rate
changes is a real phenomenon” and “PTM is not universal.” Krugman also suggested
both static and dynamic models to explain PTM. His static and dynamic models included
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supply and demand, monopolistic price discrimination, and oligopolistic models.
Krugman concluded in his paper, “explaining pricing to market is not as simple as one
might hope. It seems clear that a perfectly competitive model will not do the trick…” and
“the best hope of understanding pricing to market therefore seems to come from dynamic
models of imperfect competition.”
Although Krugman did not attempt to find a better explanation for PTM, his
provocative research did bring attention to subsequent researchers. At the end of the
1980s, the U.S. dollar depreciated sharply, and the relationship between U.S. exports and
fluctuations of the exchange rates attracted researchers’ interests. Knetter (1989)
developed a specific functional model to study PTM associated with exchange rate
fluctuation. Based on solving an exporters’ profit maximizing problem, Knetter (1989)
established his model
(6)

Ln p it = θ t + λi + β i Ln s it + u it

where the variable pit is the export price to destination market i at period t, and s it is the
exchange rate (destination market’s currency per unit of exporter’s currency) of the
destination market i at period t. The parameter β i measures the elasticity of the export
price changes relative to the exchange rate changes. The parameter θ t is the time effect,

λi the country effect, and u it the regression disturbance. Knetter’s model was able to
distinguish between three different market conditions: a competitive market, an
integrated market, and a noncompetitive market, depending on the estimated coefficients
values for λi and βi .
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If the market is competitive, by the Lerner Index we know that price equals
marginal cost and the Lerner Index is zero. In this case, the time effect, θ t , measures the
common price and there is no variation in the data correlated to the country effect, λi , or
the exchange rate, s it . In this model, the estimated coefficients for λi and βi should be
zero.
In contrast, if one or both of the estimated coefficients of λi and βi are not zero,
then the market is not competitive. Knetter applied this model to U.S. exports of onions,
bourbon, orange juice, breakfast cereal, refrigerators, and switches, as well as German
exports of fan belts, titanium dioxide pigment, small cars, large cars, beer, white wine,
sparkling wine, and potassium chloride. Knetter’s estimation results indicated that “U.S.
export prices are rather insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations,” and “German export
prices appear to be much more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.”
Using a similar model, Knetter (1993) subsequently studied the PTM behaviors
from both source and destination countries in the world market. Knetter used industry
level data from the U.S., the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan to compare the PTM
behaviors from these countries. Knetter found that the PTM behaviors were very similar
across source countries, including Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. For U.S.
exports, the PTM behaviors were very similar across destination markets.
The PTM model basically deals with the relationship between export prices and
exchange rates. However, the PTM model does not work in China’s case, since the
Chinese exchange rate does not fluctuate but rather is pegged to the U.S. dollar. The
exchange rates between Chinese currency, RMB (Yuan), and U.S. dollars were quite
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stable for a long time. Figure 20 shows that the exchange rate between Chinese currency,
RMB (Yuan), and the U.S. dollar was almost constant at 8.28 (RMB/USD) from 1998 to
2005 (USDA-ERS, 2006). Recently, under international pressure, the Chinese
Government promised to reform China’s exchange rate policy, and is now practicing
limited floating exchange rates. The current exchange rate is 8.01(RMB/USD) as of May
2006, showing slight movement.
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Figure 20. Exchange Rate between Chinese Yuan (RMB) and U.S. Dollars
Data Source: USDA-ERS, 2006.
Residual Demand Elasticity Model
Baker and Bresnahan (1988) first developed the residual demand model to
measure market power of a single firm in an imperfect market. Baker and Bresnahan
argued that under perfect competition with homogeneous products, if a firm reduced its
production, then other firms would offset the shortage due to one firm’s contraction.
Therefore the residual demand faced by any single firm was infinitely elastic. However,
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with imperfect competition or differentiated products, the residual demand curve faced by
a single firm was negatively sloped. They defined the inverse demand function for the
firm of interest (firm 1) as
(7)

P1 = P1 (Q1 , Q, Y; α1 )

where the variables P1 and Q1 are price and quantity for firm 1’s product, Q is a vector of
quantities for substitute products produced by the other firms, Y is a vector of exogenous
demand shifters, and α1 are parameters. If assuming that all products are homogenous,
then equation (7) can be written as
(7’)

P1 = P1 (Q1 + ∑ Q i , Y; α1 )
i

In regards to vector Q in equation (7), it is expressed in a similar inverse residual
demand form
(8)

Pi = P i (Q, Q1 , Y; α i ) for all i ≠ 1.

The third component in Baker and Bresnahan’s model includes the supply behavior of all
firms for i ≠ 1 . These supply relations are written through the marginal cost (MC)
equaling the perceived marginal revenue (PMR)
(9)

MC i (Qi , W , W i ; β i ) = PMR i (Q, Q1 , Y ; α i , θ i ) for all i ≠ 1

where the expression PMR i (⋅) is P i (⋅) + Qi ⋅ ∑ j [(∂P i / ∂Q j )(∂Q j / ∂Qi )] . The vector W
is the industry-wide factor prices and the vector W i is the firm-specific factor prices.
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Parameters β i are associated with the marginal cost function, and the parameter θ i
indexes the oligopoly solution component ( ∂Q j / ∂Qi ) for all firms.
Single firm’s residual demand function was derived by solving equation (8) and
(9) simultaneously for the vectors Q and P. In implicit form, the solution could be
written as
(10)

Q = E i (Q1 , Y , W ,W i ; α i , β i , θ i )

where the function E i (⋅) means that this was the equilibrium quantity in all markets for

i ≠ 1 . Finally, substituting equation (10) into equation (7) and removing redundancies,
equation (7) becomes
(11)

P1 = R(Q1 , Y ,W ,W 1 ; α , β i , θ i )

where the function R (⋅) is the inverse residual demand function for firm 1.
Baker and Bresnahan took three U.S. brewing firms – Anheuser-Busch, Coors,
and Pabst – as their samples to estimate and analyze the residual demand curves faced by
these three companies. They found that for the period 1962-1982, Anheuser-Busch had
some market power, Coors had substantial market power, and Pabst had no market power.
Baker and Bresnahan’s work provided a new approach to measure market power of a
single firm with differentiated products within a national market.
Goldberg and Knetter (1999) adopted the residual demand model to measure the
degree of competition in segmented export markets. They started from the general case,
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which assumed homogenous products and a group of exporters facing a particular foreign
destination market, and defined the residual demand function as
(12)

P ex = D ex (Q ex , P1 ,..., P n , Z)

(13)

P k = D k (Q k , P j , P ex , Z) where j = 1,..., n and j ≠ k

where the variable P ex is the price of the exported good, and Q ex is the total export
quantity. The variables P 1 , … P n are the prices of n competing products produced in
other countries, and Z is a vector of demand shifters in the destination markets.
By solving the exporters’ profit maximizing problem, Goldberg and Knetter wrote
the specific functional form of the first order condition as
(14)

'
'
N
LnPmtex = λ m + η m LnQ ex
mt + α m LnZ mt + β m LnWmt + ε mt

where the subscript m indexes a specific market, the vector Z denotes demand shifters for
destination market m, and the vector W consists of cost shifters for the N competitors
faced by the export group in a particular destination market. Finally, the random
disturbance ε is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
Goldberg and Knetter used annual data for U.S. Kraft linerboard paper (19731987) and German beer (1975-1993) to estimate this model. In the case of German beer,
their empirical results indicated that “the elasticity of the residual demand curve German
exporters face in each destination is closely related to the presence of the Netherlands as
a competitor,” and for U.S. linerboard exports, “strong evidence of imperfect competition
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in the case of Australia, which is a very small market where U.S. firms face almost no
competition from other producers.”
Carter, et al. (1999) tested the world wheat market using the residual demand
elasticity (RDE) model. Their application of RDE model to the world wheat market
provided a new approach to measure market power for wheat, a key international bulk
agricultural commodity market. Carter, et al. assumed that each country was a firm, and
that parameters could be interpreted as share-weighted industry averages for all firms
within one country. Based on Goldberg and Knetter’s RDE model, Carter, et al. directly
defined the reduced form of the inverse residual demand function for U.S. wheat as
(15)

LnPt u = α + η u LnQtu + β c LnWt c + β a LnWt a + γLnZ t + ε t

where the variable Ptu is the price of U.S. wheat exported to Japan in yen, and Q ut
represents the quantity of U.S. wheat exported to Japan. The vector Wtc is a set of cost
shifters for a U.S. export competitor, Canada, and the vector Wta is a set of cost shifters
for another U.S. export competitor, Australia. The vector Z t includes demand shifters in
Japan. Parameters α , η , β , and γ are to be estimated. The error term ε is assumed to
be distributed independently and identically. The subscript t stands for time period.
Through this double-log form Carter, et al. estimated the price flexibility for U.S. wheat
exports to Japan directly.
Carter, et al. used quarterly data (1970 to 1991) to estimate their model (15).
Their results indicated that “the United States is possibly a price leader in the Japanese
market for imported wheat whereas Australia and Canada form a competitive fringe.”
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Glauben and Loy (2003) compared the PTM model and the RDE model when
examining market power for German food and beverage export industries over
international markets. They found controversial results from these two models: in some
cases the PTM model indicated market power, while the RDE model did not. They
explained this conflict by fixed contracts, which were often used in the food and beverage
export market.
Poosiripinyo and Reed (2005) applied the RDE model to the Japanese chicken
meat market and estimated price flexibilities of Japanese inverse residual demand for
whole birds, legs with bone, and other cuts from Brazil, China, Thailand, and the United
States. Their results indicated that only Brazil (in whole birds and leg with bone) and the
U.S. (in other cuts) have significant market power over Japanese chicken meat importers
as shown in Table 2 (Poosiripinyo and Reed, 2005).
Table 2. Summary Results of Residual (Inverse) Demand Elasticities

Products

Price: Residual (Inverse) Demand Elasticity (RDE)
Brazil

China

Thailand

Whole Birds

-0.253**

-0.108

0.104**

-0.111

Legs with Bone

-0.103**

-0.048

-0.061

0.024

-0.020

-0.020

-0.081

-0.229**

Other Cuts

United States

** significant at 1% level
* significant at 5% level

Poosiripinyo (2004) summarized the advantage and disadvantages of the RDE
model. The advantages of the RDE model include 1) the RDE model can measure
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market power with modest data requirements, which are generally lacking in domestic
and international markets; 2) the RDE model can be defined in double-log form and the
elasticity can be estimated directly; and 3) the RDE model can incorporate exchange rate
variable in the model as an indicator of marginal cost change. The disadvantages of the
RDE model include 1) the RDE model entails a loss of price elasticity of demand; and 2)
the estimated coefficients are difficult to interpret. With these disadvantages of the RDE
model, however, in cases where the Lerner Index is very difficult or infeasible to compute,
the RDE model appears to be the next best alternative to evaluate market power.
Review of World Soybean Market Studies
The FAPRI/CARD International Oilseed Model

The Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) in the Center for
Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) developed an International Oilseed Model,
a non-spatial, partial-equilibrium econometric global model. The FAPRI’s international
oilseed model includes major oilseed producing, exporting, and importing countries or
regions. Their model also assumes each seed, meal, and oil as a homogeneous commodity.
A key factor in the FAPRI’s model is that when world prices are linked to domestic prices,
estimated or consensus price transmission elasticities are used, assuming that agents in
each country are price-takers in the world market (FAPRI/CARD, 2005).
FAPRI/CARD’s price transformation model was written as
(16)

P D = α + βP W * r * ( 1 + d )

Where P D is the domestic price, and P W is the world price of the commodity including
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international transportation costs. Variable r is the exchange rate, and d captures policy
interventions between the world and domestic markets and is expressed in ad valorem
form. Parameter α and β are to be estimated.
The FAPRI/CARD international oilseed trade model incorporated four oilseeds
including soybeans, rapeseed, sunflower seed, and peanuts. Their model also included
palm oil, palm kernel meal, and palm kernel oil. The countries/regions covered in their
model can be found in Table 3 (FAPRI/CARD, 2005).
Table 3. Commodity and Country Coverage of the FAPRI/CARD International
Oilseed Model
Soybeans
Argentina

Soybean Meal
Argentina

Soybean Oil
Argentina

Brazil

Brazil

Brazil

Canada

Canada

Canada

China

China

China

EU New Member States

EU New Member States

EU New Member States

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

India

India

India

Japan

Japan

Japan

Other Former Soviet Union

Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union

South Korea

South Korea

South Korea

Taiwan

Taiwan

Taiwan

United States

United States

United States

Rest of World

Rest of World

Rest of World

Rapeseed
Australia

Rapeseed Meal
Canada

Rapeseed Oil
Australia

Canada

China

Canada

China

EU New Member States

China

EU New Member States

European Union - 15

EU New Member States

European Union - 15

India

European Union - 15

India

Japan

India
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Japan

Other Former Soviet Union Japan

Other Former Soviet Union

United States

Other Former Soviet Union

United States

Rest of World

United States

Rest of World

Rest of World

Sunflower Seed
Argentina

Sunflower Meal
Argentina

Sunflower Oil
Argentina

China

China

China

EU New Member States

EU New Member States

EU New Member States

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

Other Former Soviet Union

Other Former Soviet Union Other Former Soviet Union

United States

United States

United States

Rest of World

Rest of World

Rest of World

Palm Oil
China

Palm Kernel Meal
European Union - 15

Palm Kernel Oil
China

European Union - 15

Indonesia

European Union - 15

India

Malaysia

Indonesia

Indonesia

Rest of World

Malaysia

Malaysia

Rest of World

Rest of World
Peanuts
Argentina

Peanut Meal
Argentina

Peanut Oil
Argentina

Canada

China

China

China

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

European Union - 15

India

India

India

United States

United States

Mexico

Rest of World

Rest of World

United States
Rest of World

From a supply perspective, the FAPRI/CARD’s international oilseeds model
incorporates equations for area harvested, yield and production. From the demand side, it
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includes crush, seed, food, stocks, and other consumption. “The crush demand is driven
by the oil demand and/or by meal demand. Given the joint product of oil and meal and
the positive economic value attached to meal, the derived demand from crushing reflects
both oil and meal. The derived demand for crush oilseeds is driven by the crush margin.”
(FAPRI/CARD, 2005).
Another assumption made in the FAPRI/CARD model is that trade in seeds, oil,
and meal is an excess demand/supply and provides market closure. For each commodity,
world price adjusts to clear the world market and ensure that the sum of excess demands
over all countries is zero. The FARPRI/CARD model is also linked to other FAPRI
model components in their livestock and commodities models.
Economics Research Service/Penn State Trade Model

The USDA-Economic Research Service (ERS)/Penn State Trade Model is a
multiple-commodity, multiple-region model of agricultural policy and trade. Their model
does not distinguish a region's imports by their source or a region's exports by their
destination. The model is a gross trade model that accounts for exports and imports of
each commodity in every region. The ERS/Penn State Trade Model incorporates 12
countries/regions and 35 commodities as shown in Table 4 (Abler, 2005). In addition,
the model also includes both general policy and country specific components. General
policy components include specific and ad valorem import and export taxes/subsidies,
tariff-rate quotas (TRQs), and producer and consumer subsidies. Country specific
components include the U.S. loan rate; production quotas for milk for Canada; producer
target prices, producer compensation schemes for Japan and South Korea; intervention
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prices, variable import levies, compensatory payments, acreage set-asides, base area
bounds, and production quotas for raw milk and sugar in the European Union.

Table 4. Country and Commodity Coverage of the ERS/Penn State Trade Model
United States, European Union (EU-15), Japan,
Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, China,
Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, and a region
(12 countries/regions)
for the rest of the world (ROW).
rice, wheat, corn, other coarse grains (barley,
sorghum, millet, and oats), soybeans, sunflower
13
seed, rapeseed, peanuts, cotton, other oilseeds
commodities
(canola, flax seed, and others), tropical oils, and
sugar
soybean oil and meal, sunflower seed oil and meal,
12 oilseed
rapeseed oil and meal, cottonseed oil and meal,
products
Commodity
peanut oil and meal, other oilseed oil and meal
Coverage
Country Coverage

4 livestock
products

beef and veal (combined), pork, poultry, raw milk

6 processed
dairy
products

fluid milk, butter, cheese, nonfat dry milk, whole
dry milk, and other dairy products (ice cream,
yogurt, and whey)

The ERS/Penn State Trade Model adopted a reduced-form economic model in
which the behavior of producers, consumers, and other economic agents is represented by
elasticities and other model parameters. The elasticities used in this model are assumed
to be constant and draw from other trade models, including the European Simulation
Model (ESIM), the ERS baseline projections model, and the Food and Agricultural
Policy Simulator (FAPSIM), among others.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THEORETICAL MODEL
Introduction
As presented in Chapter two, globally, China is the number one soybean importer,
and the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters. In 2004, Chinese
soybean imports accounted for 35% of the world total, and soybean exports from the
above three soybean exporting countries accounted for over 90% of the world total.
Given the above aggregate market shares of these soybean traders in the world soybean
market, the world soybean market may not be perfectly competitive. Focusing on the
Chinese soybean import market, it may be characterized as either a monopsony where
China, as the leading soybean importer, has stronger market power relative to the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina, or as an oligopoly where the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, as the
leading soybean suppliers, have relatively stronger market power than Chinese soybean
importers. This research seeks to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese
soybean import market, analyze its competitive structure, and compare competitiveness
of the three soybean exporters.
To conduct the competitive structure analysis of the Chinese soybean import
market, it is critical to know whether the market is characterized as either a monopsony
or an oligopoly. Therefore, knowing the market power of different players in the Chinese
soybean import market is a key factor in understanding the competitive structure of the
market. To measure market power of soybean traders in the Chinese soybean import
market, an inverse residual soybean supply, an inverse residual soybean demand, and a
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two-country partial equilibrium soybean trade model, combining the inverse residual
soybean supply and the inverse residual soybean demand, were developed, estimated, and
compared in this research.
Modification of the Lerner Index from the Exporters’ Perspective
Following Carter, et al. (1999), assuming that all the soybean exporters in the
soybean exporting country can be considered as an aggregated firm, estimated
coefficients can be interpreted as the share-weighted industry averages for all soybean
exporters in a soybean exporting country. In addition, soybeans exported to China from
different countries are assumed homogeneous products.
As shown in Figure 21, left panel, the Chinese residual soybean demand for
country i’s (i=the U.S, Brazil, and Argentina) soybeans equals the summation of the
Chinese domestic soybean supply, SCH; plus Chinese imports from countries other than
country i, IMPOTH; and the net change of soybean stocks in China, STKCH; this
cumulative supply minus the Chinese domestic soybean demand, DCH. From the soybean
exporting country’s perspective, it is assumed that soybean exporters in country i face a
i
downward sloping residual soybean demand curve RDCH
as shown in Figure 21, right

panel. The curve MCi in the right panel of Figure 21, is the marginal cost for soybean
exporters in country i. To maximize soybean export profits, the soybean exporters in
country i choose point A in Figure 21, right panel, where marginal cost equals marginal
revenue, as the optimal choice. Accordingly, the equilibrium export quantity is QiXPT at
the equilibrium export price, Pi XPT . The distance between A and B can be viewed as the
mark-up for soybean exporters in country i.
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SCH + IMPOTH+∆STKCH

P

P

B

Pi XPT

DCH

Pi Farm

China’s Domestic Soybean Market

A

i
RDCH

MRi
Q

O

MCi

O

QiXPT

Q

Soybean Exports of Country i
--Chinese Residual Soybean Demand for Country i
* i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina

Figure 21. China’s Residual Demand for Country i’s Soybeans
Mathematically, soybean exporters in country i choose export quantity to China,
QiXPT , to maximize their profits, π i ,

(17)

Max π i = Pi XPT ( QiXPT )* QiXPT − ( Pi Farm + Ci ) * QiXPT
QiXPT

where i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina, and π i is profits obtained by soybean exporters
in country i. The variable Pi XPT is the soybean export price by country i, which is a
function of its export quantity, QiXPT . The variable Pi Farm is the soybean farm level price
in country i, or the exporters’ purchase cost from soybean farmers in country i, and C i is
the soybean exporters’ transaction costs in country i.
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The first order condition (FOC) gives

(18)

⎛ ∂Pi XPT
⎞
∂π i
⎜⎜
=
* QiXPT + Pi XPT ⎟⎟ − ( Pi Farm + Ci ) = 0
XPT
XPT
∂Qi
⎝ ∂Qi
⎠
⎛ ∂P XPT
⎞
==> ⎜⎜ i XPT * QiXPT + Pi XPT ⎟⎟ − ( Pi Farm + Ci ) = 0
⎝ ∂Qi
⎠

==> Pi

(19)

==>

XPT

− ( Pi

Farm

∂Pi XPT
+ Ci ) = −
* QiXPT
XPT
∂Qi

Pi XPT − ( Pi Farm + Ci )
∂Pi XPT QiXPT
∂Pi XPT / Pi XPT
*
=
−
=
−
Pi XPT
∂QiXPT Pi XPT
∂QiXPT / QiXPT

Comparing equation (19) with the Lerner Index, equation (5), the left hand side of
equation (19) looks similar to the Lerner Index, LI =

P − MC
. Defining
P

Pi XPT − ( Pi Farm + C i )
as the Adjusted Lerner Index for country i (ALIi), the market
Pi XPT
power for soybean exporters in country i over Chinese soybean importers can be
measured by the Adjusted Lerner Index for country i. The right hand side of equation (19)
is the price flexibility of China’s inverse residual demand for soybeans from country i.
Therefore the price flexibility of China’s inverse residual demand for soybeans from
country i can be used as an indirect measure to evaluate market power of soybean
exporters in country i.
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The next step is to derive the relationship between the soybean export price in
country i, Pi XPT , and the farm level soybean price in country i, Pi Farm . Consider equation
(19) above. Assuming that the unitary transaction costs of soybean exporters in country i,

C i , are a constant ratio, γ i , of the country i’s farm level soybean price, Pi Farm , i.e.

γi =

Ci
∂Pi XPT / Pi XPT
CH
,
and
set
θ
=
, which is the price flexibility of the Chinese
i
∂QiXPT / QiXPT
Pi Farm

inverse residual demand for soybeans from country i, then equation (19) can be written as

Pi XPT − ( Pi Farm + γ i Pi Farm )
= −θ iCH
XPT
Pi
==> Pi XPT − (1 + γ i ) Pi Farm = −θ iCH * Pi XPT
==> (1 + θ iCH ) * Pi XPT = (1 + γ i ) Pi Farm

(20)

==> Pi Farm =

(21)

Set ϕ i =

(1 + θ iCH ) XPT
Pi
(1 + γ i )

(1 + θ iCH )
(1 + γ i )

Then equation (20) can be written as
(22)

Pi Farm = ϕ i Pi XPT

Equation (22) indicates a linear relationship between the farm level price and the export
price in country i, assuming that in the short-run, the price flexibility of the Chinese
inverse residual demand is constant.
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Modification of the Lerner Index from the Importers’ Perspective
From the Chinese soybean importers’ side, facing exporting country i’s upward
sloping residual soybean supply, Chinese soybean importers choose an optimal import
quantity to maximize their import profits.
The curve RS iCH , in the left panel of Figure 22, is exporting country i’s residual
soybean supply for China, which equals the exporting country i’s domestic supply, S i ;
minus domestic demand, Di ; minus exports to countries other than China, XPTOTH ;
minus the change of soybean stocks in exporting country i, ∆STK i . To maximize
Chinese import profits, facing the residual soybean supply curve, RS iCH , Chinese
soybean importers choose point C in Figure 22, left panel, where Chinese soybean
importers’ marginal revenue, MRCH , equals their marginal import costs, MCCH .
i , IMP
at the equilibrium import
Accordingly, China’s equilibrium import quantity is QCH

i , IMP
.
price PCH

Mathematically, Chinese soybean importers choose import quantity from
i , IMP
i
, to maximize their import profits, π CH
:
exporting country i, QCH

(23)

i
Max π CH
=
i , IMP
QCH

PCH
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
* QCH
− [(1 + t ) PCH
(QCH
) + CCH ] * QCH
ERCH

i
where π CH
is the import profits obtained by Chinese soybean importers, and PCH is the

i , IMP
is the Chinese soybean
Chinese domestic soybean retail price. The variable PCH
i , IMP
is the Chinese soybean import quantity
import price from exporting country i, and QCH
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from exporting country i. The variable ERCH is the exchange rate, t is the Chinese
import tariff rate (ad valorem) on soybean imports, and C CH is the transaction costs paid
by Chinese soybean importers.

MRCH
P
PCH
i , IMP
PCH

P
C
D

RS iCH

Si

MCCH
Di+ XPTOTH + ∆STKi

0

Q

i , IMP
QCH

0

Q
Exporting Country i’s Domestic
Soybean Market

Chinese Soybean Imports
--Exporting Country i’s Residual
Soybean Supply

i = the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina
Figure 22. Exporting Country i’s Residual Soybean Supply to China

The first order condition (FOC) gives

(24)

i , IMP
i
⎞
∂π CH
∂PCH
PCH ⎛
i , IMP
i , IMP
⎜
=
−
(
+
t)
*QCH
+ [( 1 + t)PCH
+ CCH ] ⎟⎟ = 0
1
i , IMP
i , IMP
⎜
ERCH ⎝
∂QCH
∂QCH
⎠

==>

⎞
∂P i , IMP
PCH ⎛
i , IMP
i , IMP
− ⎜⎜ ( 1 + t) CH
*QCH
+ [( 1 + t)PCH
+ CCH ] ⎟⎟ = 0
i , IMP
ERCH ⎝
∂QCH
⎠

==> (PCH /ERCH ) − CCH − ( 1 + t)P

i , IMP
CH

i , IMP
∂PCH
i , IMP
= ( 1 + t) i , IMP *QCH
∂QCH
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i , IMP
i , IMP
∂PCH
(PCH /ERCH ) − CCH − (1 + t ) PCH
i , IMP
==>
*QCH
=
i , IMP
1+ t
∂QCH

(25)

i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
(PCH /ERCH ) − CCH − (1 + t ) PCH
QCH
∂PCH
∂PCH
/ PCH
* i , IMP =
=
==>
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
(1 + t ) PCH
∂QCH
PCH
∂QCH
/ QCH

Similar to equation (19), the left hand side of equation (25) looks similar to the
Lerner Index, LI =

i , IMP
(P /ERCH ) − CCH − (1 + t ) PCH
P − MC
. Define CH
as the Adjusted
i , IMP
(1 + t ) PCH
P

Lerner Index for Chinese soybean importers, ALICH, which can be used to measure
monopsony power of Chinese soybean importers over soybean exporters in country i.
The right hand side of equation (25) is the price flexibility of the country i’s inverse
residual soybean supply for China. The market power of Chinese soybean importers can
be measured indirectly by estimating the price flexibility of country i’s inverse residual
soybean supply function for China.
The next step is to derive the relationship between the Chinese soybean import
i , IMP
price from exporting country i, PCH
, and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price,

RTL
.
PCH

Reconsidering equation (25), the following is obtained
RTL
i , IMP
=
(PCH
/ERCH ) − C CH − ( 1 + t )PCH

RTL
/ERCH =
==> PCH

i , IMP
i , IMP
∂PCH
/ PCH
i , IMP
( 1 + t )PCH
i , IMP
i , IMP
∂QCH / QCH

i , IMP
i , IMP
∂PCH
/ PCH
i , IMP
( 1 + t )PCH
+ C CH + ( 1 + t )PCiH, IMP
i , IMP
i , IMP
∂QCH / QCH
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RTL
CH

==> P

/ERCH

i , IMP
i , IMP
QCH
∂PCH
i , IMP
* i , IMP + 1 )( 1 + t)*PCH
=(
+ C CH
i , IMP
PCH
∂QCH

i , IMP
⎡ ∂P i , IMP QCH
⎤
i , IMP
RTL
= ⎢( CH
+ 1 )( 1 + t)*PCH
+ CCH ⎥*ERCH
*
==> PCH
i , IMP
i , IMP
PCH
⎣ ∂QCH
⎦

Similarly, assuming that transaction costs for Chinese soybean importers, C CH ,
are a constant ratio, γ CH , of the Chinese soybean import price, i.e. γ CH =

i
setting θCH
=

CCH
and
i , IMP
PCH

i , IMP
i , IMP
∂PCH
QCH
, which is the price flexibility of exporting country i’s
*
i , IMP
i , IMP
∂QCH
PCH

inverse residual soybean supply function for China, and it can be used to measure the
market power of Chinese soybean importers over soybean exporters in country i, then,
the above equation becomes
RTL
i
i , IMP
i ,IMP
PCH
= [( θ CH
+ 1 )( 1 + t )PCH
+ γ CH PCH
]*ERCH

(26)

RTL
i
i , IMP
==> PCH
= [( 1 + t)( 1 + θ CH
) + γCH ]*ER CH *PCH

During the period of this research (January 1999—February 2005), the Chinese import
tariffs on soybeans and the Chinese exchange rate to U.S. dollars were constant. Setting
(27)

i
ϕ CH = [(1 + t )(1 + θ CH
) + γ CH ] * ERCH

*5.1

then equation (27) can be written as
(28)

i , IMP
==> PCH = ϕ CH *PCH

*5.1

Since China had a fixed exchange rate, which was pegged to the U.S. dollar, there were no changes in
the Chinese exchange rate.

63

Equation (28) shows the relationship between the Chinese soybean import price from
i , IMP
exporting country i, PCH
, and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, PCH .

China’s Inverse Residual Soybean Demand Model
As shown in Figure 21, the China’s residual demand for exporting country i’s
soybeans equals the Chinese domestic demand for soybeans, DCH ; minus Chinese
domestic soybean supply, S CH ; minus Chinese soybean imports from countries other than
OTH
; plus the net change of Chinese soybean stocks, STKCH.
country i, IMPCH

Mathematically, the Chinese residual demand function for exporting country i’s soybeans
can be written as
(29)

i
OTH
RDCH
= DCH − ( S CH + IMPCH
) + ∆STK CH

where the Chinese domestic demand and supply functions are defined as
(30)

D
DCH = DCH ( PCH ; Z CH
)

(31)

S
S CH = S CH (PCH ; Z CH
)

D
is a vector of
where the variable PCH is the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, Z CH

Chinese demand shifters, including the prices of substitutes or complements, income,
S
population, among others; and Z CH
is a vector of Chinese supply shifters, including

prices of substitutes or complements, technology, production costs, among others.
Chinese imports from countries other than country i and Chinese stocks of soybeans are
considered as exogenous variables in this research.
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Substituting the Chinese soybean domestic demand (equation (30)) and the
Chinese domestic supply (equation (31)) into the Chinese residual demand for exporting
country i’s soybeans (equation (29)), and writing it in its implicit form, equation (29)
becomes
(32)

i
D
S
OTH
RDCH
= RD ( PCH ; Z CH
, Z CH
, IMPCH
, ∆STK CH )

Chapter 2 reviewed Chinese biotech policies and their impacts on soybean trade.
To test the impacts of Chinese biotech policies on soybean exports to China, a dummy
variable, the Chinese biotech policy, BP CH , is added to this model, then equation (32)
becomes
(33)

i
D
S
OTH
RDCH
= RD ( PCH ; Z CH
, Z CH
, IMPCH
, ∆STK CH , BPCH )

Considering the relationship between the Chinese soybean import price from
exporting country i and the Chinese domestic soybean retail price, equation (28) is
substituted into equation (33) to obtain
(34)

i
i , IMP
D
S
OTH
RDCH
= RD ( PCH
; Z CH
, Z CH
, IMPCH
, ∆STK CH , BPCH )

Writing equation (34) in its inverse form, it becomes
(35)

i , IMP
i , IMP
i
D
S
OTH
PCH
= PCH
( RDCH
; Z CH
, Z CH
, IMPCH
, ∆STK CH , BPCH )

Equation (35) is the Chinese inverse residual demand function for exporting country i’s
soybeans.
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Exporting Country i’s Inverse Residual Soybean Supply Model
As shown in Figure 22, exporting country i’s residual soybean supply to China
equals the domestic soybean supply in exporting country i, S i ; minus its domestic
soybean demand, Di ; minus the soybean exports to countries other than China, XPTi OTH ;
plus the net change of soybean stocks, ∆STK i . Mathematically, exporting country i’s
residual soybean supply function to China can be written as
(36)

RS iCH = S i − ( Di + XPTi OTH ) + ∆STK i

Where domestic demand and supply functions in exporting country i are defined as
(37)

Di = D ( Pi Farm ; Z iD ) *5.2

(38)

S i = S(Pi Farm; Z iS )

The variable Pi Farm is the farm level soybean price in exporting country i, Z iD is a vector
of demand shifters in exporting country i, including prices of substitutes or complements,
income, population, among others; and Z iS is a vector of supply shifters in country i,
including the prices of substitutes or complements, technology, production costs, among
others. The soybean exports from country i to countries other than China, XPTi OTH , and
the soybean stock changes, ∆STK i , are considered as exogenous variables.

*5.2

Assuming a constant marketing margin between the U.S. soybean retail price and the U.S. farm level
price, the U.S. farm level price can be used in the U.S. domestic demand function instead of the U.S.
soybean retail price for estimation purposes.
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Substituting domestic soybean supply (equation (38)) and domestic soybean
demand (equation (37)) into exporting country i’s residual soybean supply function for
China (equation (36)) and writing it in its implicit form, equation (36) becomes
(39)

RS iCH = RS ( Pi Farm ; Z iS , Z iD , XPTi OTH , ∆STK i )

Considering the relationship between the soybean export price for China and the
farm level soybean price in exporting country i, substituting equation (22) into equation
(39) results in
(40)

RS iCH = RS ( Pi XPT ; Z iS ,Z iD , XPTi OTH , ∆STK i )

Writing equation (40) in its inverse form as
(41)

Pi XPT = Pi XPT ( RS iCH ; Z iS , Z iD , XPTi OTH , ∆STK i )

equation (41) is exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply function to China.
The Two-Country Partial Equilibrium Trade Model
Assuming other source countries for Chinese imported soybeans and destination
countries of country i’s soybean exports are exogenous factors, a two-country partial
equilibrium trade model can be specified
(35)

i , IMP
i , IMP
i
D
S
OTH
PCH
= PCH
( RDCH
; Z CH
, Z CH
, IMPCH
, ∆STK CH , BPCH )

(41)

Pi XPT = Pi XPT ( RS iCH ; Z iS , Z iD , XPTi OTH , ∆STK i )

(42)

i
RDCH
= RS iCH

(43)

i , IMP
i , IMP
PCH
= PCH
( Pi XPT )

Where i= exporting countries: U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
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Equation (35) is the Chinese inverse residual demand function for exporting
country i’s soybeans, and equation (41) is exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean
supply function for China. Equation (42) is the equilibrium condition where, at
equilibrium, the Chinese residual soybean demand for country i equals exporting country

i’s residual soybean supply for China. Equation (43) captures the relationship between
the Chinese soybean import price and exporting country i’s soybean export price. Data
used in this research for the Chinese soybean import price is CIF (Cost, Insurance, and
Freight) price, which includes the transportation costs and insurance costs. Data for
exporting country i’s soybean export price is FOB (Free on Board) price. Equation (43)
reflects the information of transportation and insurance costs.
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CHAPTER SIX
VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION
For empirical estimation purposes, variables in equation (35) and (41) will be
identified and the specific functional form for China’s inverse residual demand model,
exporting country i’s inverse residual supply model, and the two-country partial
equilibrium trade model will be developed in this chapter.
China’s Inverse Residual Soybean Demand Model
Equation (35) includes four groups of variables. The first group is the Chinese
soybean import quantity from exporting country i or the Chinese residual demand for
i
country i’s soybeans, RDCH
. The second group is Chinese domestic demand shifters,

D
. Theoretically, demand shifters include income, population, prices of substitutes
Z CH

and complements, and consumers’ preferences, among others. In this research, demand
shifters for Chinese domestic soybeans include: the price of corn in the Chinese domestic
Corn
market, PCH
, assuming that corn is a substitute for soybeans for both soybeans and corn

can be used for feed and oil, the Chinese personal disposable income, INC CH , and the
livestock development index, LDI CH , since soybeans can be crushed into soymeal, which
is mainly used for feed.
In regards to the variable LDI CH , the Chinese livestock industry has developed
rapidly in recent years, whereby soymeal is a main feed material for Chinese livestock.
As presented in Chapter two, in 2004, about 74% or 28 million metric tons of soybeans
were crushed in China and soymeal from crushed soybeans are mainly used for feed
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purposes. The development of the livestock industry in China spurred an increasing
demand for soymeal, which led to an increase in soybean demand. The livestock
development index, LDI CH , was developed by calculating the chain growth rate of
Chinese total meat output. Meats used to calculate this index include beef, pork, poultry,
Oil
,
and fish. In addition, the Chinese domestic soybean product prices -- soyoil price, PCH

Oil
-- were also included in the model.
and soymeal price, PCH

The third group is Chinese soybean supply shifters. Theoretically, supply shifters
include production costs, the prices of substitutes or complements, and technology,
among others. In this research, supply shifters of Chinese soybeans include the corn
Corn
price in the Chinese domestic market, PCH
. Similarly, as in the Chinese domestic

soybean demand model, corn is assumed to be a substitute for soybeans. Another
variable included in the Chinese domestic soybean supply model is technology, measured
by the time trend variable, T . Production costs are not included in the model. Data used
in this research is monthly data. However, data for production costs for soybeans is
yearly data. Production costs are not included in the model to avoid a multicollinearity
problem with time trend variable.
OTH
The last group includes Chinese soybean imports from other countries, IMPCH
,

and the Chinese biotech policy, BPCH . For the variable representing Chinese biotech
policy, as discussed in Chapter three, China passed its first biotech product regulation in
May 2001. Therefore, in this research, the variable BPCH equals 0 before May 2001 and
1 otherwise. Since Chinese soybean stocks are very low and have not changed much
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during the period of this research (January 1999—February 2005), changes of the
Chinese soybean stocks are not included in this model.
Based on the theoretical model and the above analysis, the specific functional
form of the Chinese inverse residual demand for exporting country i’s soybeans is written
as

(44)

i , IMP
i
Corn
Oil
PCH
= α 0 + αRDCH
+ α1 PCH
+ α 2 INCCH + α3 LDI CH + α 4 PCH
Meal
OTH
+ α5 PCH
+ α 6T + α 7 IMPCH
+ α8 BPCH + ε CH

Definitions of the variables in equation (44), including units, where $ equals U.S. dollars,
MT equals metric tons, and RMB equals Chinese yuan, are listed as follows.
i , IMP
: The Chinese soybean import price from exporting country i ($/MT);
PCH

i
: The Chinese residual demand for exporting country i’s soybeans (MT), or the
RDCH
Chinese soybean import quantity from exporting country i;
Corn
: Chinese corn price (RMB/MT);
PCH

INC CH : Chinese personal disposable income (RMB);
LDI CH : The Chinese livestock industry development index, which is the growth rate of
Chinese meat production, including pork, beef, poultry, and fish;
Oil
: Chinese soyoil price (RMB/MT);
PCH

Meal
: Chinese soymeal price (RMB/MT);
PCH

T : Time trend variable, measuring technological progress;
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OTH
: Chinese soybean imports from countries other than exporting country i (MT);
IMPCH

BPCH : Chinese biotech policy, a dummy variable, equaling 0 before May 2001 and 1
otherwise;

ε CH : Error term, assumed identically and independently distributed.
Exporting Country i’s Inverse Residual Soybean Supply Model
Similar to the Chinese inverse residual demand function for country i’s soybeans,
exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply function for China, equation (41),
also includes five groups of variables. The first group is the soybean export quantity
from country i to China, or exporting country i’s residual soybean supply for China,
RS iCH . The second group is soybean demand shifters in exporting country i, including

personal disposable income within country i, INC i ; the domestic price of corn in country

i, Pi Corn , a substitute for soybeans; the soyoil price in country i, Pi Oil ; and the soymeal
price in country i, Pi Meal . The third group is soybean supply shifters for exporting
country i, including technology, measured by the time trend variable, T , and the price of
corn in country i, Pi Corn . The fourth group is country i’s soybean exports to countries
other than China, XPTi OTH . The last group is country i’s soybean beginning stocks, STK i .
Then, based upon the theoretical model and the above analysis, the specific
functional form of exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply function for
China can be written as

(45)

Pi XPT = β 0 + βRS iCH + β1 Pi Corn + β 2 INCi + β 3 Pi Oil + β 4 Pi Meal + β 5T
+ β 6 XPTi OTH + β 7 STK i + ε i
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where Pi XPT : Exporting country i’s soybean export price to China ($/MT);
RS iCH : Exporting country i’s residual soybean supply for China, or country i’s soybean
exports to China (MT);

INC i : Personal disposable income for exporting country i ($);
Pi Corn : Corn price in country i ($/MT);
Pi Oil : Soyoil price in country i ($/MT);
Pi Meal : Soymeal price in country i ($/MT);
XPTi OTH : Soybean exports from country i to countries other than China (MT);

STK i : Beginning soybean stocks in country i (MT);

ε i : Error term, assumed identically and independently distributed.
Two-Country Partial Equilibrium Trade Model
Combining China’s inverse residual demand for exporting country i’s soybean
(equation (44)) and exporting country i’s inverse residual soybean supply for China
(equation (45)), and incorporating the equilibrium condition, where China’s residual
demand for exporting country i’s soybeans equals exporting country i’s residual soybean
i
supply to China, i.e., RDCH
= RS iCH , the specific functional form of the two-country

partial equilibrium trade model can be written as
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(44)

(45)

i , IMP
i
Corn
Oil
PCH
= α 0 + αRDCH
+ α1 PCH
+ α 2 INCCH + α3 LDI CH + α 4 PCH
Meal
OTH
+ α5 PCH
+ α 6T + α 7 IMPCH
+ α8 BPCH + ε CH

Pi XPT = β 0 + βRS iCH + β1 Pi Corn + β 2 INCi + β 3 Pi Oil + β 4 Pi Meal + β 5T
+ β 6 XPTi OTH + β 7 STK i + ε i

(42)

i
RDCH
= RS iCH

(43)

i , IMP
PCH
= φ 0 + φ1 Pi XPT

where i= exporting countries: the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
Assuming that in the short-run, the price flexibility of either the Chinese inverse
residual demand for exporting country i’s soybeans or exporting country i’s inverse
residual soybean supply to China is constant, then equations (42)-(45) can be estimated
by the double-log or semi-log form as shown by equations (46) to (49).

(46)

(47)

i, IMP
i
i
Corn
LnPCH
= α 0 + θ CH
LnRDCH
+ α1 LnPCH
+ α 2 LnPINCCH + α 3 LnLDI CH
Oil
Meal
OTH
+ α 4 LnPCH
+ α 5 LnPCH
+ α6 LnT + α7 LnIMPCH
+ α 8 BP CH + ε CH

LnPi XPT = β 0 + θ iCH LnRS iCH + β1 LnPi Corn + β 2 LnPINCi + β 3 LnPi Oil
+ β 4 LnPi Meal + β 5 LnT + β 6 LnXPTi OTH + β 7 LnSTK i + ε i

(48)

i
LnRD CH
= LnRS iCH

(49)

i , IMP
LnPCH
= φ 0 + φ1 LnPi XPT

where i=exporting countries: the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
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The equation system, equations (46) to (49), is the finalized specific functional
form of the two-country partial equilibrium soybean trade model.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION AND INTERPRETATION
Introduction
Since most of the data for Brazil and Argentina are not available, only the U.S.China partial equilibrium soybean trade model (equation system (46-49) is estimated in
this research.
Data Description
Data used in this research are monthly data from January 1999 to February 2005,
74 observations. The variables used in this research and their sources are listed in Table 5.
For China’s inverse residual soybean demand model, the variables for Chinese soybean
US
CH
residual demand, RDCH
, U.S. residual soybean supply, RS US
, are from the Chinese

Minister of Agriculture (MOA, 2006). The variable Chinese soybean import price is a
derived price—Chinese soybean import value (Cost Insurance and Freight (CIF) value)
divided by import quantity, and is also obtained from the Chinese Minister of Agriculture.
The variable Chinese corn price, soyoil price and soymeal price are from Shanghai JC
Intelligence Co., Ltd. (2005).
The variable Chinese personal disposable income comes from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Economics Research Service (USDA-ERS)—International
Macroeconomic Data Set (USDA-ERS, 2006). The raw data for Chinese personal
disposable incomes are annual data. However, in this research, monthly data is required.
To include personal disposable income in this model, the personal disposable income was
transformed into monthly format, as described below.
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Table 5. Variables and Their Sources

Variable
US , IMP
PCH

US
RDCH

Corn
PCH

INC CH
LDI CH

Meaning
Chinese soybean import price
from the United States
(RMB/MT);
Chinese residual demand for U.S.
soybeans (MT);
Chinese corn price at Dalian Port
(RMB/MT);
Chinese personal disposable
income (RMB);
Chinese livestock industry
development index;

Source
The Chinese Minister of
Agriculture.
The Chinese Minister of
Agriculture.
Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd.
USDA-ERS.
Chinese Statistics Yearbook
(1999-2005).

Oil
PCH

Chinese soyoil prices (RMB/MT);

Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd.

Meal
PCH

Chinese soymeal prices
(RMB/MT);

Shanghai JC Intelligence Co., Ltd.

BR
IMPCH

Chinese soybean imports from
Brazil (MT);

The Chinese Minister of
Agriculture.

AR
IMPCH

Chinese soybean imports from
Argentina (MT);

The Chinese Minister of
Agriculture.

PUSEXP
CH
RS US

U.S. soybean export price to
China ($/MT);
U.S. soybean residual supply for
China (MT);

USDA-FAS.
The Chinese Minister of
Agriculture.

INCUS

U.S. personal disposable income
($);

USDA-ERS.

PUSCorn

U.S. corn retail price at Chicago
market ($/MT);

USDA-ERS.

PUSOil

U.S. soyoil price ($/MT);

USDA-ERS.

PUSMeal

U.S. soymeal price ($/MT);

USDA-ERS.

XPTUSEU
XPTUSJP

U.S. soybean exports to the EU
(MT);
U.S. soybean exports to Japan
(MT);

XPTUSMX

U.S. soybean exports to Mexico
(MT);

USDA-FAS.

STK US

U.S. soybean beginning stocks
(MT).

USDA-ERS.
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USDA-FAS.
USDA-FAS.

To transform the personal disposable income from annual form to monthly form,
the average growth rate, consistence, and precision were taken into consideration. First,
the annual growth rate of Chinese personal disposable income was calculated. Second,
an initial value was set as the January income. Then the calculated annual growth rate
and the assumed initial value were used to estimate the incomes of the remaining months
of the year. Next step is by using trial-and-error method to adjust the January income to
ensure that the sum of the estimated income for each month equals the actual annual
income. Figure 23 compares the actual annual data and the estimated monthly data for
Chinese personal disposable income. Figure 23 indicates that the estimated monthly data
has a similar trend as the actual annual data, statistically, the estimated monthly income
can be used as an approximate to the real monthly income in the empirical estimation.
The variable Chinese livestock development index, LDI CH , is developed by
calculating the annual growth rate of Chinese total meat output, including beef, pork, and
poultry, and fish*7.1. The actual data of meat output is annual data from the Chinese
Statistics Yearbook, 1999-2005 (Chinese National Bureau of Statistics, 2005). The same
method is used to transform the actual annual data into estimated monthly data. The
estimated monthly data was used as an approximate of the real monthly data. Then the
monthly growth rate of the estimated meat output is calculated as an index to reflect the
demand change in feed due to rapid development of the Chinese livestock industry,

LDI CH .

*7.1

Although fish does not belong to the livestock industry, feed for fish also contains a great amount of
soymeal. Therefore, when calculating the livestock development index, I also included fish meat in the
total meat output.
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Chinese Personal Disposable Income (Actual Annual Data)
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Figure 23. Chinese Personal Disposable Income: Annual and Monthly
OTH
The variable Chinese soybean imports from other countries, IMPCH
, includes

two countries--Brazil and Argentina. So in the specific functional form of the Chinese
OTH
inverse residual demand model, the variable IMPCH
is divided into two variables:
BR
, and Chinese soybean imports from
Chinese soybean imports from Brazil, IMPCH

AR
. Data for these two variables are also from the Chinese Minister of
Argentina, IMPCH
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OTH
BR
AR
Agriculture. After dividing the variable IMPCH
into two variables: IMPCH
and IMPCH
,

China’s inverse residual demand for U.S. soybean model (equation 46) becomes
US, IMP
US
US
Corn
= α 0 + θ CH
+ α1 LnPCH
+ α 2 LnPINCCH + α 3 LnLDI CH
LnPCH
LnRDCH

(50)

Oil
Meal
BR
AR
+ α 4 LnPCH
+ α 5 LnPCH
+ α6 LnT + α7 LnIMPCH
+ α 8 LnIMPCH

+ α 9 BP CH + ε CH

For the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply to China model, the variables U.S.
soybean export price to China is a derived price (FOB price) obtained by dividing the
total monthly value of U.S. soybean exports by the total monthly volume of U.S. soybean
exports. Data for U.S. soybean export value and volume were obtained from the U.S.
Department of Agriculture, Foreign Agriculture Service (USDA-FAS, 2006)—U.S. Trade
Internet System. The variable U.S. personal disposable income comes from USDA-ERS,
International Macroeconomic Data Set (2006). Similar to Chinese personal disposable
income, the raw data of U.S. personal disposable income is annual data. Using the same
method as used for Chinese personal disposable income, U.S. monthly personal
disposable income is estimated from the actual annual income. Figure 24 compares the
actual annual data and the estimated monthly data for U.S. personal disposable income,
and it shows that the estimated monthly data has the similar trend as the actual annual
data.
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Figure 24. U.S. Personal Disposable Income: Annual and Monthly
The variable the U.S. corn price comes from USDA-ERS, Feed Outlook Report
from 1995 to 2005 (USDA-ERS, 2005b). The variables U.S. soyoil price, U.S. soymeal
price, and U.S. soybean stocks come from USDA-ERS, Oil Crops Yearbook from 20022005 (USDA-ERS, 2005c). The variable U.S. soybean exports to countries other than
China, EXPUSOTH , is divided into three variables: U.S. soybean exports to the EU, EXPUSEU ,
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U.S. soybean exports to Japan, EXPUSJP , and U.S. soybean exports to Mexico, EXPUSMX .
Data for these three variables come from USDA-FAS—U.S. Trade Internet System
(USDA-FAS, 2006). After dividing the variable EXPUSOTH into three variables: EXPUSEU ,
EXPUSJP , and EXPUSMX , U.S. inverse residual soybean supply for China model (equation 47)

becomes
CH
CH
LnPUSXPT = β 0 + θ US
LnRS US
+ β 1 LnPUSCorn + β 2 LnPINCUS + β 3 LnPUSOil
Meal
+ β 4 LnPUSi
+ β 5 LnT + β 6 LnXPTUSEU + β 7 LnXPTUSJP

(51)

+ β 8 LnXPTUSMX + β 9 LnSTK US + ε US

Then the U.S.-China partial equilibrium soybean trade model (equations 46-49)
becomes
US, IMP
US
US
Corn
= α 0 + θ CH
+ α1 LnPCH
+ α 2 LnPINCCH + α 3 LnLDI CH
LnPCH
LnRDCH
Oil
Meal
BR
AR
+ α 4 LnPCH
+ α 5 LnPCH
+ α6 LnT + α7 LnIMPCH
+ α 8 LnIMPCH

(50)

+ α 9 BP CH + ε CH
CH
CH
LnPUSXPT = β 0 + θ US
LnRS US
+ β 1 LnPUSCorn + β 2 LnPINCUS + β 3 LnPUSOil

(51)

Meal
+ β 4 LnPUSi
+ β 5 LnT + β 6 LnXPTUSEU + β 7 LnXPTUSJP

+ β 8 LnXPTUSMX + β 9 LnSTK US + ε US

(52)

US
CH
LnRD CH
= LnRS US

(53)

US , IMP
LnPCH
= φ 0 + φ1 LnPUSXPT

Specification Test
Before estimating the U.S.-China partial equilibrium soybean trade model,
heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicollinearity tests are conducted for both
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China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans (equation 50) and U.S.
inverse residual soybean supply function for China (equation 51).

Heteroskedasticity Test
White’s test (White 1980) is used to test the heteroskedasticity problems for both
China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans (equation 50) and U.S.
inverse residual soybean supply function for China (equation 51). The residuals of
estimation are used to investigate the heteroskedasticity of the true disturbances. The null
hypothesis for White’s test is
H0: σ i2 = σ 2 for all i.
SAS “proc model” procedure gives the test results when the option “White” is
given (SAS, v.8.02). Test results, shown in Table 6, indicate that the null hypothesis for
equation (50) and (51) cannot be rejected for both models. These test results imply that
both China’s inverse residual demand function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply
function do not encounter the heteroskedasticity problem.
Table 6. White’s Test Results for Heteroskedasticity
Function

White's
Test
Statistic

Critical
Value

Pr>ChiSq

Result

The China’s inverse residual
demand function for U.S.
soybeans (equation 50)

63.13

67.5

0.2687

Fail to
reject H0.

The U.S. inverse residual
soybean supply function for
China (equation 51)

62.81

67.5

0.3097

Fail to
reject H0.
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Autocorrelation Test
Autocorrelation problem was tested by testing the correlation of the current
residual and the lagged residual obtained from the ordinary least square estimation (OLS).
First, initial residuals were obtained by OLS estimation (by SAS). Next step is running
regression of the current residual et on the lagged residual et −1 to test whether the
parameter of et −1 is significant or not. Mathematically,
(54)

et = c0 + c1et −1 + u

where et is the residual from the OLS estimation, and et −1 is the lagged residual.
Hypothesis to be tested is
H0: c1 =0, Ha: c1 ≠ 0.
Test results for both China’s inverse residual demand function (equation 50) and
U.S. inverse residual supply function (equation 51), shown in Table 7, imply that the null
hypothesis for China’s inverse residual demand function, cannot be rejected. However,
the null hypothesis for U.S. inverse residual supply function is rejected. These test
results indicate that China’s inverse residual demand function does not appear to
encounter the autocorrelation problem, while the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply
function does have autocorrelation. To improve empirical estimation results, the
autocorrelation problem for the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function need to be
corrected.
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Table 7. Test Results for Autocorrelation

Coefficient

Standard
T-value Pr>ChiSq
Error

The Chinese inverse
residual demand function
for U.S. soybeans
(equation 50)

-0.0041

0.1274

-0.03

0.9743

Fail to reject
H0.

The U.S. inverse residual
soybean supply function
for China (equation 51)

0.357

0.1208

2.96

0.0044

Reject H0.

Function

Result

Multicollinearity Test
Two methods are used to test for multicollinearity. The first one looks at the
correlations among independent variables. If the correlation between two variables is
very high, then the multicollinearity problem may be present.
Test results for China’s inverse residual demand function for U.S. soybeans,
reported in Table 8, show that the correlation between the time trend variable, T , and
Chinese personal disposable income, INC CH , is 0.99 and the correlation between the time
trend variable, T , and the Chinese livestock development index, LDI CH , is 0.98. That
means the time trend variable, T , is possibly a problematic variable, which causes
multicollinearity problem.
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Table 8. Correlation between Independent Variables for the Chinese Inverse
Residual Demand for U.S. Soybeans

Correlation RD US P Corn
CH
CH
US
RDCH

P

INC CH
LDI CH
Oil
CH

P

Meal
CH

P
T
BR
IMPCH
AR
CH

BPCH

Oil
LDI CH PCH

Meal
PCH

BR
AR
IMPCH
IMPCH
BPCH

T

1

Corn
CH

IMP

INC CH

-0.11
-0.06
-0.05

1
0.62
0.66

1
0.85

1

0.03

0.22

0.15

0.20

1

-0.03
-0.05

0.58
0.63

0.78
0.99

0.82
0.98

0.38
0.04

1
0.78

-0.25

0.27

0.36

0.34

0.01

0.35 0.38

1

-0.32
-0.14

0.11
0.58

0.30
0.87

0.29 -0.02
0.83 -0.07

0.36 0.32
0.48 0.86

0.70
0.33

1
1
0.24

1

Test results for U.S. inverse residual soybean supply for China, reported in Table
9, show that the correlation between the time trend variable, T , and the U.S. personal
disposable income, INCUS , is 0.96, which means that there is a possible collinearity
problem between these two variables.
From this method, results indicate that for both China’s inverse residual demand
function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply, the time trend variable, T, might cause
the multicollinearity problem.
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Table 9. Correlation between Independent Variables for the U.S. Inverse Residual
Soybean Supply for China

CH
Corn
PUSOil
PUSMeal T
XPTUSEU XPTUSJP XPTUSMX STK US
Correlation RS US INCUS PUS
CH
RS US
1
INCUS
-0.03
1
PUSCorn
0.03
0.49
1
Oil
PUS
-0.02
0.50 0.84
1
Meal
PUS
0.01
0.62 0.70 0.67
1
-0.05
1
0.96 0.63 0.63 0.64
T
XPTUSEU
0.50
-0.23 -0.08 -0.14 -0.15 -0.20
1
JP
XPTUS
0.42
-0.12 -0.22 -0.20 -0.31 -0.15
0.59
1
MX
XPTUS
0.20
-0.16 -0.22 -0.23 -0.27 -0.13
0.42
0.32
1
STK US
0.49
-0.08 0.07 -0.11 0.07 -0.10
0.35
0.28
-0.01
1

The second method is the Condition Indices developed by Belsey, Kuh, and
Welsch (1980). When the calculated condition index is around 10, weak dependencies
may be starting to affect the regression estimates. When this number is larger than 100,
the estimates may have a fair amount of numerical error (SAS, v8.02). In SAS, option
COLLIN automatically tests multicollinearity problem and gives suggested variables
which may cause multicollinearity problem. SAS estimation results for both China’s
inverse residual demand function and U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function,
indicate that the time trend variable, T , was the only variable that caused the
multicollinearity problem. To avoid multicollinearity problem, in the final estimation,
the time trend variable, T , was dropped.

87

Empirical Estimation and Interpretation
In this section, the two-country partial equilibrium trade model (equation 50-53)
is estimated simultaneously by SAS full information maximum likelihood (FIML)
method. Estimation results, reported in Table 10, show that for China’s inverse residual
demand function (equation 50), four variables, including the Chinese residual demand,
US
Corn
, the Chinese domestic corn price, PCH
, and the prices of soyoil and soymeal in
RDCH

Oil
Meal
and PCH
, are statistically significant at a 1% significant level.
China, PCH

US
, is
The sign of the estimated coefficient for the Chinese residual demand, RDCH

negative as expected, indicating a downward sloping residual demand for U.S. soybeans.
By equation (55), the estimated coefficient is also the price flexibility of the Chinese
residual demand function for U.S. soybeans, equaling the Adjusted Lerner Index, ALIUS,
which can be used to measure the market power of U.S. soybean exporters as shown by
equation (19). From another perspective, the estimated coefficient also indicates the
market margin of U.S. soybean exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export
price and the sum of the U.S. farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S.
soybean exporters). Results from Table 10 imply that the U.S. soybean exporters’
marketing margin is 4% of the U.S. farm level soybean price.
For the estimated coefficient of the Chinese domestic corn price, results imply
that keeping other variables constant, a 1% corn price increase will cause a 27% increase
in the Chinese soybean import price from the United States. For the Chinese domestic
prices of soyoil and soymeal, they are moving in the same direction with the soybean
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import price. The estimated cross price elasticities of the Chinese soybean import price
from the U.S. with respect to the soyoil or soymeal prices are 0.44 and 0.30 respectively.
Table 10. Estimation Results of the Two-country Partial Equilibrium Model
Equation

Variable
Intercept

Pr > |t|

-1.19

0.2405

-0.0392***

0.0141

-2.78

0.0074

INC CH
LDI CH

0.2717***
0.2961
0.5782

0.0914
0.5201
0.8977

2.97
0.57
0.64

0.0044
0.5714
0.5222

Oil
PCH

0.4430***

0.0743

5.96

<.0001

0.3011***

0.0794

3.79

0.0004

-0.0015

0.0010

-1.48

0.1448

-0.0005
-0.0692

0.0009
0.0435

-0.52
-1.59

0.6062
0.1179

10.6230***

3.9991

2.66

0.0103

0.1306***

0.0405

3.23

0.0021

INCUS

-0.2770
-1.1029**

0.1442
0.5496

-1.92
-2.01

0.0600
0.0497

PUSOil

0.4348***

0.0734

5.92

<.0001

0.5027***

0.1315

3.82

0.0003

-0.0067

0.0052

-1.27

0.2082

-0.0093
-0.0848***

0.0370
0.0265

-0.25
-3.19

0.8023
0.0023

-0.0694***

0.0260

-2.67

0.0100

-0.5210

0.3634

-1.43

0.1566

1.1145***

0.0676

16.48

<.0001

P

Meal
CH

P

BR
CH

IMP

AR
CH

IMP

BPCH
Intercept
RS

CH
US

Corn
US

P

Meal
US

P

EU
US

XPT

JP
US

XPT

MX

XPT
STK US
Price Relationship:
PUSIMP = P( PUSXPT )

t Value

3.5773

US
CH

Corn
CH

U.S. Inverse
Residual Supply:
CH
PUSXPT = P ( RS US
, ...)

Standard
Error

-4.2451

RD

Chinese Inverse
Residual Demand:
US
PUSIMP = P ( RDCH
, ...)

Coefficient

Intercept
XPT
US

P

Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
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For the variable Chinese biotech policy, BPCH, the sign is negative as expected
indicating that the impacts of Chinese biotech policy on U.S. soybean exports to China is
negative. However, the variable BPCH is not significant (10% significance level),
implying that Chinese biotech policy did not impose significant impacts on U.S. soybean
exports to China in the long-run. This result is consistent with the actual observations
discussed in Chapter three.
For U.S. inverse residual soybean supply function (equation 51), seven
CH
independent variables, including the residual supply quantity, RS US
, the U.S. personal

disposable income, INCUS , the U.S. soyoil prices, PUSOil , the U.S. soymeal prices, PUSMeal ,
the U.S. soybean exports to Japan, XPTUSJP , the U.S. soybean exports to Mexico, XPTUSMX ,
and the U.S. soybean stocks, STK US , are statistically significant at 1% to 5% significance
levels respectively as shown in Table 10. The sign of the parameter for the U.S. soybean
CH
residual supply for China, RS US
, is positive as expected, indicating an upward sloping

U.S. residual soybean supply for China.
By equation (56), the estimated coefficient for the U.S. soybean residual supply
CH
quantity, RS US
, is also the price flexibility of the U.S. inverse residual soybean supply

function for China, which is also the Adjusted Lerner Index, ALICH by equation (25),
which can be used to measure the market power of Chinese soybean importers. From
another perspective, according to the left hand side of equation (25), this estimated
coefficient also indicates the marketing margin of Chinese soybean importers (the
difference between the Chinese domestic soybean price and the sum of Chinese soybean
import price from the U.S. and transaction costs of Chinese soybean importers and import
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tariffs). Results from Table 10 imply that the marketing margin of Chinese soybean
importers is 13% of the soybean import price from the U.S. plus tariffs.
Table 11 summarizes the above discussion. The estimated price flexibility of the
Chinese inverse residual demand for U.S. soybeans is -0.04, implying that the marketing
margin for U.S. soybean exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export price
and the sum of the U.S. farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S.
soybean exporters) is 4% of the export price. The estimated price flexibility of the U.S.
inverse residual soybean supply function for China is 0.13, implying that the marketing
margin for Chinese soybean importers is 13% of the soybean import price plus tariffs.
Comparing these two coefficients, it can be inferred that the market power of Chinese
soybean importers is stronger than that of U.S. soybean exporters.
Table 11. Summary of the Estimation Results
Model

Coefficient
for Quantity

Standard
Error

TValue

Pr>|t|

Chinese Inverse Residual Demand:
IMP
PUSIMP = P (QCH
,...)

-0.04***

0.0141

-2.78

0.0074

U.S. Inverse Residual Supply:
XPT
PUSXPT = P (QUS
...)

0.13***

0.0405

3.23

0.0021

Note: *** 1% significance level, ** 5% significance level, * 10% significance level.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
COMPETITIVE ANAYSIS OF CHINA’S SOYBEAN IMPORT MARKET
Results of Chapter seven show that in the Chinese soybean import market Chinese
soybean importers have stronger market power than U.S. soybean exporters. In addition,
it is assumed that Chinese soybean importers also have stronger market power than
soybean exporters from Brazil and Argentina. Based on the above results and assumption,
a competitive analysis of the Chinese soybean import market is conducted by examining
both annual and monthly data of Chinese soybean imports from these three soybean
exporting countries. In addition, after examining the competitive structure of these three
soybean exporters in the Chinese soybean import market, competitiveness of the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese soybean import market is compared by analyzing
their soybean exports costs.
The U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese Soybean Import Market
As reviewed in Chapter two, China is the number one soybean importer and the
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina are the top three soybean exporters in the world. Figure 25
shows that soybean surpluses (defined as the difference between the domestic supply and
the domestic consumption in soybean exporting countries) in the U.S., Brazil, and
Argentina increased annually in recent years. In 2005, soybean surpluses in the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina reached 33, 25, and 10 million metric tons, respectively (USDAFAS, 2006b). To avoid high accumulation of soybean stockpiles, export markets are
crucial for the soybean industries in the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
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Figure 25. Soybean Surplus in Main Soybean Exporting Countries
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D data, 2006b.
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Figure 26. Soybean Shortage in Main Soybean Importing Countries
Source: USDA-FAS, PS&D data, 2006b.
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2005

Figure 26 shows the trends of soybean shortages (defined as the difference
between the domestic consumption and the domestic production in the soybean importing
countries) for the top soybean importers in the world, including China, the European
Union, Japan, and Mexico. Soybean shortage in Japan was quite stable in the past, and
soybean shortage in the EU and Mexico did not increase much in the past decade. By
these trends, it can not be expected that the EU, Japan, and Mexico will increase their
soybean imports much in the future. However, for China, its soybean shortage increased
dramatically in recent years, from almost null in 1991 to 27 million metric tons in 2005.
Combining the above trends of soybean exporters and soybean importers, it is
reasonable to state that China is and will continue to be the most important market for the
U.S., Brazil, and Argentina’s soybean surpluses. Results from Chapter seven indicate
that Chinese soybean importers had stronger market power over U.S. soybean importers.
Three large soybean suppliers facing one large soybean buyer with a rapid growth
potential may support the assumption that Chinese soybean importers may have stronger
market power than soybean exporters from Brazil and Argentina.
Because China is the most important market for the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina,
these three soybean exporters compete with each other in the Chinese soybean import
market to expand their soybean market shares. From a soybean suppliers’ perspective,
the competitive relationship among the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese
soybean import market will be examined in the following section. To simplify the
problem, Brazil and Argentina are considered as a group, the South America (SA)
soybean supplier. As shown in figure 27, the U.S. and South America (Brazil and
Argentina) are competing in the leading soybean import market, China. However, the
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question is “what is the relationship between the U.S. and South America in the Chinese
soybean import market?”

U.S.

China

Brazil
Argentina

South America
the U.S.

Brazil

Argentina

Substitutes or Complements?
China

Figure 27. Chinese Soybean Import Market
* Source: MapQuest, Inc. (Mapquest.com).
Are the U.S. and South America Substitutive Soybean Suppliers for China?
Figure 28 shows that Chinese annual soybean imports from South America were
slightly lower than that from the U.S. before 2001 and in 2004. From 2001 to 2003 and
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2005, Chinese annual soybean imports from South America surpassed the United States.
In 2005, China imported 15.35 million metric tons of soybeans from SA with Brazil 7.95
million metric tons and Argentina 7.4 million metric tons. In contrast, China imported 11
million metric tons of soybeans from the United States. U.S. soybean exports to China
were higher than the soybean exports from either Brazil or Argentina to China, but lower
than the sum of Brazil’s and Argentina’s soybean exports to China.
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Figure 28. Chinese Soybean Imports from the U.S. and South America
Source: The Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006
Since soybeans produced in both the U.S. and South America contain biotech
varieties, we can assume that soybeans exported to China from the U.S. and SA were
homogeneous. If the U.S. chose to set higher export prices, China could reduce their
imports from the U.S. and increase their imports from South America, provided that
soybean stocks in the U.S. were enough to satisfy China’s soybean demand, vice versa.
By examining the soybean export prices from the U.S. and South America, it can be
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found that the soybean export prices from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina to China were
similar as shown in figure 29. Observations indicate that the U.S. and SA chose to set
their soybean export prices at similar levels, and Chinese soybean importers decided how
much to buy soybeans from each soybean supplier. Next step is to investigate the
soybean stocks in the U.S. and SA to see whether their soybean stocks can satisfy China’s
soybean demand, which is a necessary condition for the U.S. and SA to be substitute
suppliers to supply soybeans to China.
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Figure 29. Chinese Soybean Import Prices from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina*
*These export prices are derived CIF prices, divided export value by export quantity.
Those observations that export quantity was zero were deleted; Pusch is the soybean
export price from the U.S. to China, Pbrch is the soybean export price from Brazil to
China, and Parch is the soybean export price from Argentina to China.

Figure 30 shows China’s soybean imports from the U.S. and soybean stocks in SA.
If there is a production shock in the U.S. or U.S. soybean exporters raise their soybean
export prices, soybean stocks in SA are more than enough to satisfy China’s soybean
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demand. From this perspective, SA can be a substitute supplier for the U.S. to supply
soybeans to China. In contrast, Figure 31 shows China’s soybean imports from SA and
soybean stocks in the United States. If there is a production shock in SA or if SA
soybean exporters raise their soybean export prices, soybean stocks in the U.S. are NOT
enough to satisfy China’s soybean demand from 2001 to 2004. Even in 2005, U.S.
soybean stocks were just able to satisfy China’s demand. From this perspective, the U.S.
cannot serve as a complete substitute supplier for SA to supply soybeans to China. But
the U.S. could be a partial substitute for SA to supply soybeans to China.
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Figure 30. China’s Soybean Imports from the U.S. and Soybean Stocks in SA
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006a; the Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006.
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Figure 31. China’s Soybean Imports from SA and Soybean Stocks in the U.S.
Source: USDA-FAS, 2006a; the Chinese Minister of Agriculture, 2006.
The U.S. and South America Are Seasonal Complementary Soybean Suppliers for
China
Since the U.S. is located in the northern hemisphere and South America is located
in the southern hemisphere, they have opposing growing seasons, i.e., different
production time periods to supply soybeans to markets. Similar to China, the harvest
season for U.S. soybeans is in October and November, and for South America, March and
April. Figure 32 plots the U.S. monthly soybean stocks and Figure 33 shows the monthly
soybean stock levels in Brazil (Argentina data is not available). Figure 32 indicates that,
generally, U.S. soybean stocks reach the highest level in November. Then due to
consumption and exports, U.S. soybean stocks decrease to their lowest levels in August
and September, with some years in October. For Brazil (Figure 33), the soybean stocks
normally reach their highest level in April. Then due to consumption and exports,
Brazilian soybean stocks decline gradually, and reach their lowest levels in January and
February.
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Figure 32. U.S. Soybean Stocks
Source: USDA-ERS, 2005b; 2005c.
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Source: USDA-FAS, Attache Report (1998-2005).
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Because of the difference in soybean growing seasons for the U.S. and South
America, their soybean export behaviors are different. Figure 34 depicts the U.S. and
South America’s average monthly soybean exports to China from 1999 to 2004. Figure
34 clearly shows that soybean trade in the Chinese import market can be divided into two
periods. The first period is the South American period (period I), which includes June,
July, August, September, and October. In period I, SA exports just harvested soybeans to
China, without or with less storage costs, and the U.S. exports stocked soybeans to China
with additional storage costs. South America has the seasonal advantage and results in a
dominant position in the Chinese soybean import market and the U.S. is in a
disadvantageous position because of the additional storage costs.
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Figure 34. Average Monthly Soybean Exports from the U.S. and South America
(Brazil and Argentina) to China (1999-2004)
Source: the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, 2006.
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The second period is the U.S. period (period II), which includes November,
December, January, February, March, April, and May. In this period, the U.S. has just
harvested their soybeans and becomes the main soybean supplier for China, and South
America supplies only a small amount of soybeans for China from their soybean stocks
during period II. In period II the U.S. exports just harvested soybeans to China without
or with little storage costs and SA exports stocked soybeans with additional storage costs.
Therefore, the U.S. has the seasonal advantage in this period, resulting in a dominant
position in the Chinese soybean import market and SA is in a disadvantageous position
due to the additional storage costs. The above analysis implies that South America and
the U.S. are seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China, with South America
dominating period I and the U.S. dominating period II.
From the importers’ side, Chinese soybean importers may have stronger market
power relative to soybean exporters from both the U.S. and SA, and they will exercise
their monopsony power to maximize their soybean import profits. Strategically, to
reduce the risk of price increases, Chinese soybean importers will not rely on only one
soybean supplying country. Chinese soybean importers will work with different soybean
supplying countries to diversify their supply risk. Taking this seasonal factor into
consideration, we hypothesize that Chinese soybean importers will import soybeans from
SA in period I, and from the U.S. in period II. In that case, because of the market power
of Chinese soybean importers and this seasonal difference, the U.S. and SA actually
become seasonal complementary soybean suppliers for China, with SA dominating
period I and the U.S. dominating period II.

102

Competitiveness Comparison among the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the Chinese
Soybean Import Market
Competitiveness of soybean industries of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina in the
Chinese soybean import market can be evaluated by comparing their export costs.
Schnepf, et al. (2001) compared soybean export costs of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina.
Schnepf, et al. divided export costs into three categories, including production costs,
internal marketing and transportation costs, and international transportation costs.
Production costs were further separated into variable costs and fixed costs. They used
1998/99 data and compared export costs of the heartland region from the U.S., the State
of Parana and Moto Grosso from Brazil, and the northern Buenos Aires/southern Santa
Fe area from Argentina. Table 12 shows the difference of export costs for the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina.
From Table 12, we can draw the following conclusions
1. The soybean production costs in Brazil were the lowest among the three
countries, and soybean production costs in the U.S. were the highest with Argentina lying
between them and close to Brazil;
2. The internal transport and marketing costs in the U.S. were the lowest among
the three countries, and the internal transport and marketing costs in the Brazil were the
highest with Argentina lying between them and close to Brazil;
3. The freight costs from the U.S. to China were the lower relative to the freight
costs from Brazil and Argentina to China;
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Table 12. Soybean Export Costs of the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina
U.S.
Cost Item*

Heartland

Variable Costs
Fixed Costs
Total
Production
Costs
Internal
Transport &
Marketing Costs
Cost at Border

Parana

Mato Grosso

1.71
3.4

2.78
1.38

5.11

4.16

81%

3.89

76%

3.92

77%

0.43

0.85

--

1.34

--

0.81

--

5.54

5.01

90%

5.23

94%

4.73

85%

0.75

0.81

--

0.81

--

0.81

--

--

1.11

--

96%

6.65

106%

--

$/bu.

-6.29

-5.82

93%

$/bu.

% of
U.S.
Costs

Argentina
Buenos
Aires/Santa Fe
% of
$/bu.
U.S.
Costs
1.9
-2.02
--

% of
U.S.
Costs
---

$/bu.

Freight Costs to
China**
Export Tax***
Cost at Main
China Ports

Brazil

3.17
0.72

-6.04

* Data for production costs and internal transport and marketing costs are 1989/99 data
from Schnepf, et al. (2001).
** The freight costs to China are 2005 data from USDA-AMS, “Grain Transportation
Reports”, February 2005.
*** Argentina imposed a 23.5% export tax and surcharge on soybean exports from 2001.
(See Chapter three—Soybean Policies in Argentina).

4. Export taxes and surcharges increased the soybean export costs for Argentina;
5. In aggregate, the total soybean export costs for Brazil were the lowest and the
export costs for Argentina were the highest with the U.S. lying between them. However,
if the Argentinean government eliminates export taxes on soybeans, then the total
soybean export costs for Argentina will be $5.54/bushel and becomes the lowest.
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Therefore, Argentina still has a great potential to become the most competitive soybean
supplier in the Chinese soybean import market.
Summary
Based on the empirical results from Chapter seven, this chapter examined the
competitive structure of the Chinese soybean import market. As the number one soybean
importer in the world, Chinese soybean importers have stronger market power over
soybean exporters from the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina. The top three soybean suppliers
for China—the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina—compete with each other in the Chinese
soybean import market.
From China’s side, Chinese soybean importers can exercise their monopsony
power to maximize their import profits. Strategically, Chinese soybean importers will not
rely on a single soybean supplier. To reduce the risk of a price increase, Chinese soybean
importers will establish good relationships with different soybean supplying countries to
diversify their supply risk. Taking the seasonal factor into consideration, Chinese
soybean importers import most of their soybeans from South America in period I, and the
U.S. in period II. Due to Chinese soybean importers strategic choice and the seasonal
difference, the U.S. and South America (Brazil and Argentina) actually become seasonal
complementary soybean suppliers for China, with South America dominating period I
and the U.S. dominating period II.
However, from their export costs’ perspective, currently, Brazilian soybean export
costs were the lowest and Argentinean soybean export costs were the highest with the
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U.S. in the middle. However, if the Argentinean government can eliminate export taxes
on soybeans, the soybean export costs in Argentina could be the lowest.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS
Summary and Conclusions
China, as the number one soybean importer with 1.3 billion people and rapid
economic growth, becomes a potential enormous market for soybeans. Compared to
other main soybean importers in the world, China attracts more attention from the U.S.,
Brazil, and Argentina, the leading global soybean suppliers. The U.S. leads the world in
soybean production, consumption, and exports. U.S. soybean policy, including
government loan programs and direct and counter-cyclical government payment
programs, played a very important role in supporting the U.S. soybean industry and
keeping the U.S.’ leading position in the world. In the last decade, because of economic
reform in the South America (Brazil and Argentina), soybean industries in Brazil and
Argentina developed rapidly. South America became the main soybean supplier and a
strong competitor for the U.S. in the world soybean market.
With the continuous increase in excess soybean supplies in the U.S., Brazil, and
Argentina, China becomes the primary market for their soybean surplus. As a result,
these three soybean exporters—the U.S., Brazil, and Argentina—are competing in the
Chinese soybean import market. Given the above facts, we can hypothesize that the
Chinese soybean market can be characterized either by monopsony, whereby Chinese
soybean importers have stronger market power relative to soybean exporters in the U.S,
Brazil, and Argentina; or oligopoly, whereby soybean exporters from the U.S., Brazil, and
Argentina have relatively stronger market power. This research, based on the inverse
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residual demand and inverse residual supply model, developed a two-country partial
equilibrium trade model to test who has stronger market power in the Chinese soybean
import market.
Past research to test market power used either the inverse residual demand model
or the inverse residual supply model (Carter, et al., 1999; Goldberg and Knetter, 1999;
Poosiripinyo and Reed, 2005), which were defined as unrestricted models, because they
did not include an equilibrium condition. Without an equilibrium condition, estimation
results from the unrestricted model may not be reliable. This research developed a
restricted model, a two-country partial equilibrium trade model combining the inverse
residual demand and the inverse residual supply model together and incorporated the
equilibrium condition in the model as a system, to test market power of the Chinese
soybean import market.
Because data for Brazil and Argentina were difficult to obtain, this research
applied the two-country partial equilibrium model to U.S.-China soybean trade. By
comparing the results from the restricted model and unrestricted model, this research
found that results from the restricted model were more reasonable and consistent with
actual observations. The estimated price flexibilities or the Adjusted Lerner Indexes from
the restricted model also suggest that Chinese soybean importers have stronger market
power relative to U.S. soybean exporters. The marketing margin for U.S. soybean
exporters (the difference between the U.S. soybean export price and the sum of the U.S.
farm level soybean prices and the transaction costs of U.S. soybean exporters) was
estimated at 4% of the export price. In contrast, the marketing margin for Chinese
soybean importers (the difference between China domestic soybean price (in U.S. dollars)
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and the sum of soybean import price from the U.S. and import tariffs plus the transaction
costs of China’s soybean imports from the U.S.) is 13% of the soybean import price plus
tariff.
In regards to Chinese biotech policies, the estimated result from the restricted
model implies that Chinese biotech policies have not imposed significant impacts on U.S.
soybean exports to China.
On the basis of these empirical results, this research further analyzed the
competitive structure of the Chinese soybean import market. By examining monthly data,
South America and the U.S. look like seasonal complementary soybean suppliers to
China, with South America dominating period I (June, July, August, September, and
October) and the U.S. dominating period II (November, December, January, February,
March, April, and May). Possible explanation is that Chinese soybean importers exercise
their monopsony power and choose to diversify their soybean suppliers, reducing price
risk of depending on only one soybean supplier. Chinese soybean importers’ strategic
choice and the seasonal difference make the U.S. and South America seasonal
complementary soybean suppliers for China.
Comparing soybean export costs of the three countries, Brazil has the most
advantage in soybean production costs, followed by Argentina and the U.S.; the U.S. has
the most advantage in its internal transport and marketing costs, followed by Argentina
and Brazil; and the U.S. also has the advantage in its international transportation costs
compared to Brazil and Argentina. One disadvantage for the Argentinean soybean
industry is its export tax and surcharges imposed by their government, which reduces its
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competitiveness in the international market. In aggregate, the total soybean export costs
for Brazil were the lowest and the export costs for Argentina were the highest with the
U.S. lying between them. However, if the Argentinean government eliminates its export
taxes on soybeans, then the total soybean export costs for Argentina will be the lowest.
Therefore, Argentina still has great potential to become the most competitive soybean
supplier for China.
Policy Implications
In terms of policy implications for the U.S. soybean industry, facing strong
competition from South America, it is difficult to keep the U.S. in its lead position in the
world. In addition, we cannot expect that U.S. market share in the Chinese soybean
import market can be further expanded. If U.S. soybean production continues to grow,
other sources of soybean consumption, like industrial usage for fuel transformation, will
be required for maintaining stable farm incomes for U.S. soybean farmers. The U.S.
soybean export advantage is its relatively low marketing and transportation costs both
domestically and internationally. With the development of infrastructure in Brazil and
Argentina, this U.S. advantage will become less and less. Therefore, if the U.S. soybean
industry wants to keep their current position in the Chinese soybean import market, some
governmental policy supports may be necessary.
Future Research
When data for Brazil and Argentina are available, the two-country partial
equilibrium models for Brazil-China and Argentina-China can be empirically tested. To
precisely examine the competitiveness of the soybean industries of the U.S., Brazil, and
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Argentina in the Chinese soybean import market, costs models, which can reflect storage
costs and production costs as well as other transportation costs, can be developed and
applied. In addition, the two-country partial equilibrium trade model also can be adjusted
and applied to other bulk commodity trade in the international market.
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